

09/25/2025 Board of Directors Meeting

Written Public Comment Submissions

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Joe Kunzler

Dear Sound Transit Board;

I will be acute: The most important part of these comments is part c as parts a & b set up c. Helps that my remarks are an abridged and amplified version of those of September 16. But I want to make the point that we need Board Chair Somers to use his authority and exclude Avrum (Alex) Tsimerman so Chair Somers has the moral authority banked for the faregates/enforcement debate.

Therefore, **I'm going to be clear:**

a) Every Boardmember should please be familiar with the Board Rules. They're attached, but I offer the most relevant part below as b.

b) Please open your Board Rules to 3.16.12:

If an individual is in violation of the public comment rules in section 3.16.8 or disrupts a meeting under section 3.16.10, the appropriate chair may exclude the individual from participation in public comment periods at future meetings.

Then there is 3.16.13:

The Board chair, or committee chair in consultation with the Board chair, determines the length of the exclusion from public comment based on the seriousness of the disruption, the number of disruptions and the individual's record of conduct at meetings. After an individual's first violation or disruption, the length of the exclusion will not exceed 90 days. After an individual's second violation or disruption within a six-month timeframe, the length of the exclusion will not exceed 180 days. After an individual's third violation or disruption within an eighteen-month timeframe, the length of the exclusion will not exceed one year. During the exclusion, individuals may submit written comments to the Board administrator for distribution to Board members at future public comment periods.

I would argue that the eighteen-month clock going backward from September 11, 2025, where Tsimerman made his latest significant disruption, ends at March 11, 2024. Tsimerman at that point didn't get his one-year exclusion until August 8, 2024. I'm not sure what timeframe you/Sound Transit wish to use, but I insist you please get Tsimerman excluded.

The Tsimerman Wars have caused enough chaos over the years. Just ask Boardmembers Badassuchi or Birney or also CEO Constantine. It's time to end this round at Sound Transit.

We cannot be giving a huge award to an anti-Semitic bully, period. We are well within the red zone, and the red line has been crossed.

c) I strongly support a combination of faregates and human security presence on Link as part of the Enterprise Initiative to reimagine Sound Transit. However, for the Board Chair to be credible and politically deliver authority for Sound Transit to install faregates; IMHO the Board Chair needs to enforce the Sound Transit Board Rules with a new tenacity. There are some in the transit advocacy community to my political left who are uncomfortable with anything *enforcement*.

Thank you and as always... GO SOUND TRANSIT.

JOE SENDS

Resolution No. R2023-01

Board Rules and Operating Procedures

A RESOLUTION of the Board of the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority updating the Board Rules and Operating Procedures and superseding Resolution No. R2022-26.

WHEREAS, the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority, commonly known as Sound Transit, was formed under chapters 81.104 and 81.112 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) for the Pierce, King and Snohomish Counties region by action of their respective county councils pursuant to RCW 81.112.030; and

WHEREAS, Sound Transit is authorized to plan, construct and permanently operate a high-capacity system of transportation infrastructure and services to meet regional public transportation needs in the Central Puget Sound region; and

WHEREAS, in general elections held within the Sound Transit district on November 5, 1996, November 4, 2008 and November 8, 2016, voters approved local funding to implement a regional high-capacity transportation system for the Central Puget Sound region; and

WHEREAS, RCW 81.112.040 defines the constitution of the Sound Transit Board; and

WHEREAS, RCW 81.112.030(4) directs the Board to elect officers and adopt rules and other operating procedures at its first meeting, which was accomplished on September 17, 1993 by Resolution No. 1; and

WHEREAS, the Board last updated its rules and operating procedures on September 22, 2022 by Resolution No. R2022-26; and

WHEREAS, the Board adopted updated Board committee responsibilities on September 27, 2018 by Resolution No. R2018-41, effective January 1, 2019; and

WHEREAS, the Board has determined to improve its rules and operating procedures.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority that Resolution No. R2021-01 is hereby superseded with updated Board Rules and Operating Procedures, which are hereby adopted as follows:

1.0 Scope

- 1.1 These rules and procedures apply to the administration and operation of the Sound Transit Board of Directors.

2.0 Definitions

- 2.1 Board administrator: The clerk and secretary of the Board.
- 2.2 Board member: The members appointed to serve on the Board as provided in RCW 81.112.040.
- 2.3 Committee: A committee of the Board that is composed of Board members and is established by resolution to advise the Board and assist the Board and chief executive officer (CEO) of Sound Transit in the performance of their respective duties.
- 2.4 Emergency: Situations involving the risk or likelihood of injury or damage to persons or property, of financial loss to Sound Transit, or of impairment of public service or involving legal necessity, where the customary or established procedures of the Board reasonably cannot be followed or are not applicable.

- 2.5 Subcommittee: Any group selected by the Board, the Board chair, or a committee chair to assist a committee of the Board. Subcommittees may include representatives of other public agencies and citizens. A subcommittee may be referred to as a subcommittee, a task force or another term as may be deemed appropriate by the body or person making the selection and assignment of tasks.

3.0 Rules and operating procedures

- 3.1 **Board of Directors.** The Board strives to achieve best practices in governance, policy direction, and oversight. The Board acts as a body in making and announcing its decisions. The Board deliberates in many voices, but governs in one.

- 3.1.1 The Board and each committee and subcommittee may conduct public meetings and hearings, as well as joint meetings and hearings with other agencies for and on behalf of the Board to meet any legal requirements and enable Sound Transit to perform its statutory functions.
- 3.1.2 At the direction of the Board, a committee, or a subcommittee, the Board administrator or designee establishes the time, place, notices and procedures for such meetings and hearings consistent with their purpose or as required by law.
- 3.1.3 The Board is responsible for CEO employment and direction. The CEO is accountable to the full Board for Sound Transit's overall performance in carrying out its mission. Unless the Board has authorized such exercise of authority, decisions or instructions of individual Board members or committees are not binding on the CEO.

- 3.2 **Board members.** Board members serve on the Sound Transit Board to support the delivery of voter-approved plans.

- 3.2.1 Board members should regularly attend meetings to participate in the decision-making process, responsibly represent the public and preserve public trust.
- 3.2.2 When speaking for the Board, Board members' statements must remain consistent with official Board actions.
- 3.2.3 Board members must keep confidential any written materials and verbal information provided during executive sessions or information exempt from disclosure pursuant to the Public Records Act.
- 3.2.4 Newly appointed Board members are encouraged to take advantage of information opportunities to learn about Sound Transit, the Board's rules and operating procedures and significant Board actions.
- 3.2.5 The Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) secretary is a voting Board member and may designate an alternate. The secretary has voting status on the Board; the secretary's designee does not.
- 3.2.6 With the exception of the WSDOT secretary, designees or alternates are not permitted.
- 3.2.7 Except for purpose of inquiry or information gathering, the Board and Board members will work through the CEO to advance particular requests of staff.
- 3.2.8 Board members may contact and consult the general counsel of the agency at any time to obtain legal guidance, including guidance on executive sessions.

3.3 Board chair and vice chairs

- 3.3.1 The Board chair is the primary interface between the Board and CEO or Board administrator.

- 3.3.2 The Board chair presides at all Board meetings and also serves as the Executive Committee chair. Vice chairs preside at meetings and perform the responsibilities of the Board chair upon motion of the Board or in the event of the absence or inability to act of the Board chair.
- 3.3.3 In the event of the absence or inability to act of the Board chair and Board vice chairs, a quorum of the Board selects one of its members by an affirmative vote of a majority of the Board members in attendance to act as Board chair pro tem.
- 3.3.4 The Board chair may make or second any motion, present and discuss any matter as a Board member and vote on all matters.
- 3.3.5 The Board chair is authorized to sign resolutions, motions, contracts, warrants and other instruments and documents requiring evidence of approval by the agency as the Board may direct or as may be required to facilitate agency business. In the event that the Board chair is absent or unavailable when such signatures are required, a Board vice chair may sign such instruments and documents.
- 3.3.6 CEO requests for business travel beyond 300 miles from Sound Transit or that requires overnight lodging must be approved by the Board chair, a Board vice chair, or the Board administrator or designee after consultation with the Board chair or a Board vice chair.

3.4 Selection of Board chair and vice chairs

- 3.4.1 The Board elects two vice chairs and any other officers deemed necessary. The Board chair and vice chairs must all be from different counties and serve two-year terms that coincide with calendar years.
- 3.4.2 The Executive Committee develops recommendations to the Board for the selection of Board chairs and vice chairs when those terms are expiring. The recommendations are brought as nominations to the Board at a regularly scheduled meeting before the terms expire.
- 3.4.3 In the event of a Board chair or vice chair vacancy before the term expires, the Executive Committee develops recommendations to the Board for the remainder of the unexpired term. The recommendations are brought as nominations to the Board at the next regular Board meeting.
- 3.4.4 The WSDOT secretary chairs the Board meeting during the election, calls for the Executive Committee nominations and asks for additional nominations from the floor. Any person nominated is given the opportunity to address the Board. The WSDOT secretary then calls for a vote on each nominee, until a nominee receives a majority vote of all Board members in attendance. If no nominee receives a majority vote of the Board members in attendance, the nominee that received the lowest number of votes is eliminated from the next round of voting.

3.5 Board committees and subcommittees

- 3.5.1 The standing committees are the Executive Committee, Finance and Audit Committee, Rider Experience and Operations Committee and System Expansion Committee. The Board may establish standing committee responsibilities by separate resolution and may establish additional committees or subcommittees to serve for a specified period or to study and report on particular tasks or programs to assist the Board and its committees when necessary.

- 3.5.2 Any reference in an existing Board action to a former committee will refer to the appropriate standing committee delegated the authority previously held by the former committee or the committee that the Board chair deems most appropriate in light of the standing committee responsibilities.
- 3.5.3 Any Board member may attend committee or subcommittee meetings and participate in discussion. Only appointed Board members of a committee or subcommittee may vote on actions.
- 3.5.4 Committee or subcommittee recommendations are advisory to the Board, except on matters specifically delegated by the Board to a committee or subcommittee for final decision.
- 3.5.5 The Board establishes committee and subcommittee membership by motion.
- 3.6 **Committee and subcommittee chair and vice chair**
 - 3.6.1 The committee or subcommittee chair is authorized to sign resolutions, motions, contracts, warrants and other instruments and documents requiring evidence of approval by the committee or subcommittee when within the area of responsibility and authority level delegated by the Board. In the event that the committee or subcommittee chair is absent or unavailable when such signatures are required, the appropriate vice chair may sign such instruments and documents.
 - 3.6.2 Each committee and subcommittee elects a chair and vice chair for a two-year term, unless the Board appoints such officers and sets the terms by motion. A Board member may not serve as chair or vice chair of more than one committee. In the event of the absence or inability to act of a committee or subcommittee chair and vice chair, a quorum of that committee or subcommittee selects one of its members by majority vote to serve as committee or subcommittee chair pro tem.
- 3.7 **Board administrator.** The Board administrator is responsible for the integrity of Board documents, certification and filing of the Board's legislative acts, minutes of Board proceedings, verification of an individual's selection to sit on the Board, compliance with the provisions of chapter 42.30 RCW and any other responsibilities assigned by the Board.
- 3.8 **Rules of order.** Robert's Rules of Order guide the conduct of Board, committee and subcommittee meetings, except where in conflict with this resolution. No action of the Board, a committee or a subcommittee is invalid or ineffective by reason of noncompliance with Robert's Rules of Order.
- 3.9 **Regular meetings.** Regular Board meetings are held on the fourth Thursday of each month at 1:30 p.m. in the Ruth Fisher Boardroom at 401 S. Jackson Street, Seattle, WA, unless otherwise designated by the Board chair or Board administrator or designee upon written notice to Board members. Regular committee and subcommittee meetings are held at the times and places established by Board or committee action or by direction from the committee or subcommittee chair or Board administrator or designee upon written notice to committee or subcommittee members. When a regular meeting falls on a legal holiday, the meeting is held on the next business day unless rescheduled or canceled.
- 3.10 **Special meetings.** Special meetings of the Board, a committee, or a subcommittee may be called pursuant to RCW 42.30.080. Final action will not be taken on any matter at a special meeting that is not set forth in the special meeting notice as business to be transacted, except in the event of an emergency.

3.11 Emergencies

- 3.11.1 The Board chair or Board administrator or designee may select another meeting location when the designated location is unsafe or infeasible to meet due to an emergency.
- 3.11.2 In the event that an emergency is declared by a federal, state or local government or agency, a Board, committee or subcommittee meeting may be held remotely by phone or video conference if it is determined by the appropriate chair that it is infeasible to open the scheduled meeting location due to the emergency. Provisions will be made to allow members of the public to hear all discussion and actions.
- 3.11.3 In the event that the Board chair, with the concurrence of at least half of Board members, determines that a Board meeting is impracticable or impossible due to an emergency, the Board chair, vice chair or vice chairs may act on behalf of the Board, provided that any such action is subject to Board ratification at the next regular or special meeting.

3.12 Meeting cancellation and rescheduling. Regular meetings may be canceled or rescheduled in advance by the appropriate chair or by a majority of the Board members upon delivering written notice pursuant to RCW 42.30.090. Special meetings may be canceled by the appropriate chair, unless such meeting was called by a majority of Board members.

3.13 Agenda setting

- 3.13.1 Board, committee and subcommittee chairs, in cooperation with the Board administrator or designee, establish the order of business for meetings and identify consent agenda items. At the direction of the Board, committee or subcommittee chair, the Board administrator or designee prepares and distributes agendas in advance of regular meetings.
- 3.13.2 Agendas will include any anticipated discussions and/or actions. Agendas that include any action items must be distributed to Board, committee, or subcommittee members and the public at least six days in advance, and agenda amendments must be distributed at least 24 hours in advance of the meeting.
- 3.13.3 Any Board member may request that the appropriate chair include a topic on an agenda before the agenda is published. Board members who would like to offer an action or propose an amendment to an action should notify the appropriate chair and Board administrator in advance, except in extenuating circumstances. Members of the public may request that an issue or topic be placed on an agenda by contacting and securing approval of the Board chair.

3.14 Quorum. The Board quorum for the transaction of business is a majority of all Board members appointed and serving pursuant to RCW 81.112.040. A Board member must notify the Board chair or Board administrator or designee before any meeting if they will be unable to attend the meeting. A quorum for a committee meeting is at least half of the committee members. A quorum for a subcommittee meeting is at least a third of the subcommittee members but no less than three subcommittee members.

3.15 Attendance by phone and video

- 3.15.1 A Board member may attend any Board, committee or subcommittee meeting by phone or video except as noted in section 3.15.2. The phone or video connection must allow the Board member to hear and be heard by other Board members and the public.

- 3.15.2 The Board chair or a committee chair may identify specific Board or committee meetings that members should attend in person. For these meetings, phone or video participation will be limited to no more than 50 percent of the Board or committee membership unless additional virtual participation is permitted by suspending the rules.
- 3.15.3 Any Board member participating in a meeting by phone or video is deemed to be present at the meeting for all purposes, including, but not limited to, establishing a quorum.

3.16 Public observation and comment

- 3.16.1 Board, committee, and subcommittee actions and deliberations are conducted openly and in compliance with the Open Public Meetings Act, chapter 42.30 RCW. The Ruth Fisher Boardroom is open for public viewing of Board, committee and subcommittee meetings unless another location is designated by the chair or as provided for in sections 3.9 or 3.11.
- 3.16.2 Public comment is taken at every regular meeting where final action is taken. Public comment is accepted verbally at the meeting location or via phone or video conference and in writing unless limited at the discretion of the chair.
- 3.16.3 Public comment at Board meetings is limited to business items or reports to the Board on the Board agenda, unless expanded at the discretion of the Board chair. Public comment at committee meetings is limited to matters within the purview of the specific committee or items on the committee's agenda, unless expanded at the discretion of the committee chair. Public comment is not taken at subcommittee meetings. At special meetings, public comment is only taken on agenda items for final action.
- 3.16.4 The public comment period is an opportunity for members of the public to address the Board or committee and not a dialogue between the Board or committee and the public.
- 3.16.5 After introduction of an issue or topic, the Board or committee chair may refer the matter to the appropriate committee or subcommittee, may place it on a Board agenda, or may take any other action deemed appropriate.
- 3.16.6 Individuals who wish to speak must add their name and the item they wish to speak about to the in person or virtual public comment sign-in sheet before the meeting begins.
- 3.16.7 The Board or committee chair determines the amount of time each individual has to provide public comment and may set an overall amount of time for public comment. To ensure equal opportunity for the public to comment, the Board or committee chair may limit the number of people speaking for or against an item.
- 3.16.8 Individuals providing public comment must not engage in speech or conduct that disrupts, disturbs or otherwise impedes the orderly conduct of any meeting. Individuals must adhere to the following:
 - 3.16.8.a Comments must be related to agenda items or matters designated for public comment pursuant to section 3.16.3.
 - 3.16.8.b Comments must be made to the Board as a body and not to any individual member except in that member's Board capacity.
 - 3.16.8.c Comments must be completed within the allotted time.
 - 3.16.8.d An allotted individual's comment period may not be used for purposeful delay, including remaining silent or engaging in other activity without conveying a discernible message.

- 3.16.8.e Comments for the purpose of assisting a campaign for election of any person to any office or for the promotion of or opposition to any ballot proposition are not allowed.
- 3.16.8.f Commenters must not engage in abusive or harassing behavior including derogatory remarks, profanity or personal attacks, or the use of obscene language and gestures, assaults or threatening behavior, sexual misconduct or sexual harassment.
- 3.16.9 An individual who fails to comply with these rules for public comment may be called out of order by the Board or committee chair, and the chair may direct the speaker's microphone be turned off to end the individual's comment period. The Board or committee chair, if necessary, may also direct security personnel to assist that individual to the individual's seat.
- 3.16.10 Meeting disruptions by non-speakers are prohibited. Disruptions include, but are not limited to, the following:
 - 3.16.10.a Outbursts from members of the public who have not been recognized by the Board or committee chair for public comment.
 - 3.16.10.b Stance in the center aisle or front row of the audience, unless speaking as recognized by the Board or committee chair or waiting to speak during the public comment period.
 - 3.16.10.c Holding or placing a banner or sign in the meeting room in a way that endangers others or obstructs the free flow of people or the view of others at the meeting.
 - 3.16.10.d Behavior that intentionally disrupts, disturbs or otherwise impedes attendance or participation at a meeting.
 - 3.16.10.e Failure to follow the direction of a chair, vice chair or security personnel.
- 3.16.11 If an individual violates section 3.16.10, the Board or committee chair may direct security personnel to remove the individual from the meeting room.
- 3.16.12 If an individual is in violation of the public comment rules in section 3.16.8 or disrupts a meeting under section 3.16.10, the appropriate chair may exclude the individual from participation in public comment periods at future meetings.
- 3.16.13 The Board chair, or committee chair in consultation with the Board chair, determines the length of the exclusion from public comment based on the seriousness of the disruption, the number of disruptions and the individual's record of conduct at meetings. After an individual's first violation or disruption, the length of the exclusion will not exceed 90 days. After an individual's second violation or disruption within a six-month timeframe, the length of the exclusion will not exceed 180 days. After an individual's third violation or disruption within an eighteen-month timeframe, the length of the exclusion will not exceed one year. During the exclusion, individuals may submit written comments to the Board administrator for distribution to Board members at future public comment periods.
- 3.16.14 At the Board or committee chair's direction, the Board administrator or designee notifies an individual in writing of the specific reasons and length of the exclusion by mailing the notice to the individual's last known address, if any. The Board administrator or designee posts the notice outside the meeting location and on Sound Transit's website

and sends a copy of the notice to Board members. The notice is effective when posted. The notice remains posted for the duration of the exclusion period.

- 3.16.15 The Board or committee chair's decision to exclude an individual from public comment may be overruled by a majority vote of those Board members in attendance either at the meeting where the exclusion was announced or at the next regularly scheduled Board meeting following the exclusion.
- 3.17 **Voting.** Voting is typically done by voice vote. Only Board members, not including the WSDOT alternate, may cast votes. A roll call vote on any action may be called for by any Board member at any time before beginning discussion on the next agenda item, and such vote is recorded in the minutes. Board members in attendance may not abstain from voting on any matter proposed for action unless they believe that a vote on the matter may present a personal conflict of interest. The Board member must indicate an abstention before discussion of the proposed action.
- 3.18 **Actions.** Legislative acts of the Board of a general or permanent nature are made by resolution. Other Board actions may be made by motion. An affirmative vote of a majority of Board members in attendance is required for approval of resolutions and motions, provided that an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the entire membership of the Board is required for major decisions pursuant to RCW 81.112.040 and any other actions designated major decisions by the Board. Final action will not be taken on any action unless there was notice and an opportunity for public comment on the action. Committee recommendations for Board action are sent to the Board in the form of proposed resolutions or motions, as applicable, and are included as part of the Board's agenda, when feasible.
- 3.19 **Consent agenda.** The Board chair may include actions of a routine nature that are forwarded to the Board from a committee with a do-pass recommendation on a consent agenda. Any Board member may remove any item from the consent agenda for further discussion before a vote is taken. Items removed from the consent agenda are transferred to the regular agenda to consider and vote on separately.
- 3.20 **Executive sessions.** The Board, committees and subcommittees, upon motion or at the request of the chair, may hold executive sessions pursuant to RCW 42.30.110. Barring emergencies or other exigent circumstances, notice of the intent to hold an executive session at a Board, committee or subcommittee meeting will be provided to members 24 hours in advance along with the purpose for the executive session and any relevant materials. Before a session takes place, the Board, committee or subcommittee chair or legal counsel states the reason for and anticipated duration of the executive session and may indicate individuals, other than Board members, who may remain present during the session to facilitate the session or report the position of absent Board members. The reason for the executive session is recorded in the minutes.
- 3.21 **Adjournment and continuances.** The Board, a committee or a subcommittee may adjourn any meeting by an affirmative vote of a majority of Board members in attendance or at the chair's discretion. The duties of the Board administrator and other details of adjournment are as specified in RCW 42.30.090. Any such meeting or hearing being held, noticed or ordered by the Board or committees may be continued at any subsequent meeting pursuant to RCW 42.30.090.
- 3.22 **Minutes.** The Board administrator or designee prepares and distributes summary minutes of all meetings to Board members. The Board, committee or subcommittee chair and Board administrator or designee sign the official copies of minutes. The Board administrator or designee makes minutes available to the public pursuant to RCW 42.30.035 and retains the audio and/or video recordings as required by law.

3.23 Attendance record. Board members are recorded as present when they respond to roll call at the beginning of the meeting or when the Board administrator or designee observes or is advised of their presence. Board members who arrive after the first action are noted in the minutes as present when the Board administrator or designee observes their arrival or is advised of their presence.

3.24 Board member compensation and travel

3.24.1 The following meetings are declared to be meetings of the Board for purposes of determining reimbursement and compensation under RCW 81.112.040(3):

3.24.1.a All regular and special meetings of the Board, committees and subcommittees.

3.24.1.b Any meeting called and announced by the Board, a committee, a subcommittee or the appropriate chair, including, but not limited to, task forces, study groups, consultant selection boards, public hearings and public meetings conducted by or on behalf of the Board, provided that the primary meeting purpose is official agency business.

3.24.1.c Any meeting or conference involving other agencies, provided that the Board member's primary purpose of attendance is the conduct of agency business.

3.24.2 Board members who are part-time public officials may receive compensation pursuant to RCW 43.03.250 for each day during which the Board member attends an official agency meeting or performs statutorily prescribed duties as authorized by the Board chair or Board action.

3.24.3 A Board member will not receive compensation for a day of service if the person occupies a position, normally regarded as full-time in nature, in any agency and receives any compensation from such government for working that day.

3.24.4 Board members may be reimbursed for lawful, actual, necessary and documented travel expenses, including reasonable sustenance and lodging expenses, incurred in the conduct of agency business while outside the Sound Transit district boundaries pursuant to RCW 43.03.050. The Board or Executive Committee must approve Board member travel when beyond 300 miles from the agency or when overnight lodging is required.

3.24.5 Board members may receive allowances to cover reasonable expenses for meals, coffee and light refreshments served at a meeting to pursue agency business pursuant to RCW 43.03.050.

3.24.6 Board members may receive personal mileage reimbursement pursuant to RCW 43.03.060 when traveling for agency business and when more advantageous or economical to Sound Transit than a common carrier or agency vehicle.

3.25 Rule changes and suspension. These rules may be supplemented or amended by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of all Board members. These rules may be temporarily suspended by an affirmative vote of two-thirds of Board members in attendance at a meeting to facilitate consideration of Board action in the event of emergencies or other special circumstances.

4.0 References


4.1 Resolution No. R2018-40 Procurement, Agreements and Delegated Authority Policy

4.2 Resolution No. R2018-41 Board Committee Responsibilities

4.3 Resolution No. 81-2 Code of Ethics

4.4 Resolution No. R99-16 Procedures Governing Legal Actions

ADOPTED by the Board of the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority at a regular meeting thereof held on January 26, 2023.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Dow Constantine", written over a horizontal line.

Dow Constantine
Board Chair

ATTEST:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Kathryn Flores", written over a horizontal line.

Kathryn Flores
Board Administrator

Candace Shattuck

Please do the right thing and vote No Build.” So many reasons it is not a good use of taxpayer money, huge costs, modest if any benefits. Irreversible losses for WS businesses and individuals.

Candace Shattuck

2745 California Ave SW, Apt 435

Seattle, WA 98116

410-725-1240

Bill Hirt

Attention Sound TRansit Board: The following post from my blog <http://stopeastlinknow.blogspot.com> details problems with 2 Line operation.

Bill Hirt

A recent Seattle Times Traffic Lab article, "Seattle light rail makes history with test run across I-90 bridge" detailed Sound Transit running an electric powered railcar across the bridge at up to 55 mph. The results validated the Sound Transit project manager's confidence the trains can go full speed. The testing will continue until 2026 spring to confirm:

Four car trains, labeled as the 2 Line will travel all the way from Redmond to Lynnwood, sharing track in North Seattle with the older 1 Line

Yet there's little evidence this "engineering success" will reduce congestion. The problem is 4-car light rail trains lack the capacity to attract the riders needed to reduce peak hour congestion on multi-lane roadways and cost too much to operate during off-peak.

Sound Transit should have never been allowed to use the I-90 center roadway for light rail. Doing so precluded two-way BRT with 10 times light rail capacity, 10 years sooner, at 1/10th the cost. The Washington Department of Ecology has raised concerns the stormwater from the tracks could pollute Lake Washington.

Sound Transit compounded the capacity problem by using light rail to replace bus routes across the bridge and routing the trains through DSTT to UW and beyond. They initially estimated 50,000 riders would use light rail. The article's claim for 10,000 Starter Line passengers presumably reflects the 9442 boardings in the July ridership report. However, since each passenger presumably boarded to and from their destination only 4721 passengers used the Starter Line.

It's unclear how many Starter Line riders will be added by the extension and the 2 Line stops on Mercer Island and Judkins Park in Seattle. Sound Transit intends to add riders by using it to replace ST550 from downtown Bellevue into and out of Seattle. The route's June 4820 boardings presumably reflect 2410 passengers riding into and out of Seattle. Terminating ST550 limits Bellevue commuter's access to transit to those within walking distance of T/C and East Main station.

The need for I-90 corridor bus riders to transfer to and from light rail on Mercer Island for the commute will likely dissuade many commuters from using

transit. Again, it's unlikely 2 Line operation will reduce I-90 corridor peak hour congestion.

However, its operation will add to the problems identified in the following from August 27th Sound Transit Board meeting:

Cost pressures related to improved service delivery could require approximately \$5B more in year-of expenditure dollars

Routing 2 Line trains from Downtown Redmond Station (DRS) to and from the International District Station (IDS) will add 36 miles of revenue service. At \$30 per mile a 4-car train will cost \$4320 per trip. Sound Transit's projected 2 Line schedule requires 122 trips, costing \$527,040 daily.

The Sound Transit decision to route the 2 Line through DSTT to Lynnwood also creates an operation problem. It halves the number of 1 Line routes to SeaTac and beyond and complicates safely merging those routes when they return with 2 Line trains into IDS.

Routing 4-car trains through Bellevue to Redmond will double the noise from Starter Line 2-car trains. Sound Transit will presumably have to reduce 4-car train velocity along the route to avoid violating Bellevue noise limits.

The bottom line is the ability to route 4-car trains from Redmond to Lynnwood may be an "engineering success" but a transit system debacle. Sound Transit could mitigate the problem by terminating 2 Line trains at IDS. Let east side need define east side service, Avoid the need to halve the number of 1 Line trains to Federal Way and set 1 Line service to meet Lynnwood need.

Unnamed commenter

Sent from my iPad Consideration needs to be taken on this project, for it's continued support by the board , mayor and Dow Constantine, for its unaffordable, infeasible, and impractical, project. The rising costs, which fall on the backs of taxpayers, the ignoring of scientific studies, and the whole lack of input from the community needs to be addressed.b

Betty Lau

**Written Public Comment by Betty Lau, Sound Transit Board Meeting,
Thursday, 9/25/25, 1:30 p.m. at Union Station**

I'm Betty Lau, co-founder of Transit Equity for All and board member of the Chong Wa Benevolent Association of Washington.

First, I hope "listening to communities" as per CEO Dow's comment (KUOW interview, 8/11/25) is reflected in the new DEIS.

Second, NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) calls for studies of the full social, economic, and environmental impacts of infrastructure projects on nearby communities of color, meaning Chinatown, Japantown, and Little Saigon in the CID:

"Using the NEPA process, agencies evaluate the environmental and related social and economic effects of their proposed actions" (from What is NEPA? Emphasis mine).

The carried over 2022 DEIS is deficient in this area. It lists "no impact" or minimal impacts on CID residents, businesses and the environment or claims the impact is no more than what other general population neighborhoods would have to undergo (Sound Transit 2022 DEIS).

Here are the Seattle City Team Review recommendations on the now carried over 2022 DEIS:

"More work is needed to understand business and residential impacts, construction and transportation impacts, and strategies to avoid, minimize, and mitigate them."

"There are significant cultural and racial equity impacts of any CID alternative. We must work with community to understand impacts and identify solutions..." (June 2022). Work with community is not happening.

"Initiate a broader community development strategy that furthers RET outcomes and addresses project and cumulative impacts and historic harm to community from past infrastructure projects, and engages the City, Sound Transit, King County, and philanthropic and other partners" (Res. 32055 p. 101).

Further, the City asks: “What is the Language Access plan for any communications to the public?”

The Language Access plan calls for 2-3 in-language round tables per year for non-English speakers and community representatives. To date, none have taken place in any language. And translations are not readily available to the various language groups of the Region. At New Holly for example, where 80% of residents are immigrants and refugees, only English language light rail materials are available. Compare to Seattle Public Schools where publications are translated into the top 8 languages, available throughout the district.

Further, “The City has partnered with Sound Transit to perform a Racial Equity Toolkit analysis around the proposed Chinatown/International District and Delridge stations to inform decision making process for the project. Based on that analysis and the City's review of the DEIS...additional work is necessary, particularly in the Chinatown/International District, to develop additional project refinements and mitigations.” (CITY DEIS REVIEW Tuesday, April 19, 2022).

The City defines “additional work” as study of “...impacts to historic and cultural resources.” These historic and cultural resources include, but are not limited to: two museums, the National Register Chinatown Historic District, in-language culturally appropriate health care clinics/traditional medicine shops, services to thousands of local and regional seniors, daycares, heritage programs, tongs, family, district and benevolent associations. The 2022 DEIS doesn't mention any of them.

The City summarizes: “More information is needed to support the comparison of alternatives for Chinatown-International District segment.”

And that “More community process and analysis needed on how to avoid/minimize impacts, advance RET outcomes, and address historic harm...For Chinatown-International District, we seek additional analysis on impacts and mitigation; and additional process to address community benefits, RET outcomes, and historic harm.”

Therefore, we call on Sound Transit to conduct a thorough **racial equity analysis** of the options in the CID segment, including the North of CID (rebranded Midtown at James Street in the DSTT segment). It was done for South Lake Union with former Chief Delivery Engineer Cathal Ridge saying that the racial equity analysis was necessary “...for the board to have all information possible before

making a final decision [on the SLU route].” We expect even greater attention to an equity analysis for the CID because of historic marginalization and on-going harms.

Thank you.

Brien Chow

Written Sound Transit Board Meeting Public Comment

By Brien Chow, September 25, 2025, Union Station, 1:30 p.m.

Good afternoon. I'm Brien Chow, co-founder of Transit Equity for All.

Why Sound Transit Must Approve [The Balducci Plan](#) for the CID and the Region

1. A Regional Pattern of Community Pushback

- ***"Rethink the Link"*** by West Seattle, supporters of Smarter Transit and Re-think STRIDE in Lake Forest Park proves communities will not accept transit designs that ignore local realities, harm neighborhoods, or fail to deliver efficient, safe service.
- ***The CID's fight is part of this bigger picture:*** Sound Transit must adapt its plans to meet today's needs and fiscal realities, not force outdated designs and huge cost obligations onto the financially struggling.

2. The CID Is the Core of the Entire System

- The CID is the only point where all major transit modes intersect:
 - Link Light Rail North–South
 - Future East Link
 - Sounder Commuter Rail
 - Amtrak Cascades
 - King County Metro buses
 - Seattle Streetcar
- The existing ID Chinatown Station is already a fully built hub — the place where all lines can meet today.

3. Why the **5th Avenue Station Is the Wrong Choice**

- **Massive disruption:** 5th Avenue construction would close or restrict the CID's main commercial artery for years, devastating small businesses and displacing residents.
- **Cultural harm:** 5th Avenue is the heart of the neighborhood — tearing it up erases heritage and undermines generations of community investment.
- **Network inefficiency:** 5th Avenue is farther from King Street Station and Sounder/Amtrak platforms, forcing longer, less convenient transfers.
- **Equity violations:** The CID, a historically marginalized community, would again bear disproportionate harm.
- **Missed opportunity:** 5th Avenue will never provide seamless, world-class transfers.

4. The North/South CID Split Stations Make It Even Worse

- Splitting service into two farther out stations destroys the one-seat ride hub we already have.
- Riders would face unsafe, longer weather-exposed walks, breaking ADA accessibility principles.
- Transfers would take longer, discouraging ridership across the region.

5. Equity and Civil Rights Obligations

- The CID has already been scarred by I-5, the 2nd Avenue Extension, and stadium construction, streetcar construction.
- Federal Title VI requires avoiding disproportionate harm to minority and low-income communities — yet that's exactly what the 5th Avenue and split stations do.
- Displacement of small businesses, residents, and cultural institutions and landmarks are irreversible losses.

6. The Balducci Plan: The Best Plan for the CID... and the Region Finish the Spinel

- Uses the existing ID Chinatown Station as the hub where all light rail lines converge — no new disruption, no destruction of the neighborhood.
- Saves billions of dollars by deferring the second downtown tunnel, while still keeping it as an option for the future.
- Allows Sound Transit to focus on finishing the Tacoma-to-Everett spine first, fulfilling the most fundamental ST3 promise.
- Protects the CID while delivering faster benefits to Northend and Southend communities.
- Ensures that the system grows responsibly, based on actual ridership and affordability.

7. The Right Future Option: A 4th Avenue Station

- When Sound Transit can afford to build the second tunnel from Westlake to SODO, the 4th Avenue Super Hub is the appropriate choice.
- It would integrate directly with King Street Station, creating a world-class hub with 100+ years of value.
- But *building 4th Avenue only makes sense with a new tunnel* — but not now, the region simply cannot afford it.

8. The Cost of Getting It Wrong

- Choosing **5th Avenue or split stations** locks in inefficiency and inequity for over a century.
- Other cities spend billions fixing past mistakes — Let's avoid that regret.
- **The Balducci Plan** is about doing what is best for the entire region today, while leaving the right options open for tomorrow.

Bottom Line

The CID's fight is not just local — it's regional. By approving **The Balducci Plan to finish the spine**, Sound Transit can protect the CID, save billions, deliver Tacoma-to-Everett service sooner, and keep the door open for a future 4th Avenue SuperHub when the region can afford it.

Reject 5th Avenue and the North/South split. Commit to The Balducci Plan...
the best plan for both the CID and the entire Sound Transit region.

Brien Chow

Co-Founder
Transit Equity for All

chowbw@gmail.com, 206-853-5883

transitequity4all@gmail.com

GO TO FOR INFORMATION... linktr.ee/TransitEquityforAll_MFo4th

Sources Cited

- **The Urbanist** – *Balducci Wants a Good Transit Option for Chinatown* (Mar. 15, 2023)
- **Publicola** – *Light Rail Board Members Seek Middle Ground as Plan to Skip Chinatown–Midtown Stations Moves Forward* (Mar. 22, 2023)
- **The Urbanist** – *SLU Decision Points to Uphill Battle for Chinatown Station* (Jul. 18, 2024)
- **Sound Transit** – *Further Study Results: Chinatown–International District Alternatives Construction* (Nov. 14, 2024)
- **International Examiner** – *Sound Transit Casts Doubt on 4th Avenue Station, Resurrects Controversial 5th Avenue Option* (Dec. 5, 2024)
- **South Seattle Emerald** – *How a New Light Rail Station Could Impact the Chinatown–International District* (Jan. 24, 2025)

Sound Transit Board Meeting Public Comment

By Brien Chow, September 25, 2025, Union Station, 1:30 p.m.

Good afternoon. I'm Brien Chow, co-founder of **Transit Equity for All**.

The CID is the heart of our transit system...

the only place where Link, East Link, Sounder, Amtrak, Metro, and Streetcar all meet.

That's why **The Balducci Plan to Finish the Spine First is the best plan.**

It saves billions by “deferring” the second downtown tunnel...

protects the CID from the devastating 5th Avenue or split-station construction...

and allows Sound Transit to keep its most fundamental promise... ***finishing the Tacoma-to-Everett spine first.***

When the region can afford a second tunnel in the future...

a **4th Avenue Super Hub** will be the right choice.

But today, we need the Balducci Plan...

the only plan that protects the CID and delivers faster, fairer service for the entire region.

“ReThink the Link” is about accountability and equity.

The Balducci Plan embodies that... it protects the CID, delivers real service faster, and keeps future options open.

Do the right thing for the CID and for the entire region — approve the **Balducci Plan** and build a transit system worthy of Seattle's future.

I urge you: Reject 5th Avenue and split stations.

Approve the Balducci Plan.

Brien Chow

Co-Founder

Transit Equity for All

chowbw@gmail.com, 206-853-5883

transitequity4all@gmail.com

GO TO FOR INFORMATION... linktr.ee/TransitEquityforAll [MFo4th](#)

Sources Cited

- **Publicola** – *Light Rail Board Members Seek Middle Ground as Plan to Skip Chinatown–Midtown Stations Moves Forward* (Mar. 22, 2023)
- **The Urbanist** – *Balducci Wants a Good Transit Option for Chinatown* (Mar. 15, 2023)
- **Sound Transit** – *Further Study Results: Chinatown–International District Alternatives Construction* (Nov. 14, 2024)

- **International Examiner** – *Sound Transit Casts Doubt on 4th Avenue Station, Resurrects Controversial 5th Avenue Option* (Dec. 5, 2024)
- **South Seattle Emerald** – *How a New Light Rail Station Could Impact the Chinatown–International District* (Jan. 24, 2025)
- **The Urbanist** – *SLU Decision Points to Uphill Battle for Chinatown Station* (Jul. 18, 2024)

Bill Huenefeld

Dear Board Members and Advisors:

Please make a wise business decision and cancel any action to plan or build a West Seattle line of Sound Transit. The return on the investment does not make sense. Most of the potential riders of the train are happy riding buses today.

I see that some of you may benefit from the politics of providing years of employment for Union workers and profits for contractors. But construction of a West Seattle railroad is costly, causes pollution during construction and upsets sleepy West Seattle. The tax would be money out of the pockets of your constituents and the return on the investment would be very low.

While there will be some loud people who want a train, most people living in West Seattle will be happy with your decision to not build a rail line to West Seattle.

Sincerely,
Bill Huenefeld
West Seattle
206-909-1371

Jan Roberts

Leverage what West Seattle has -- very fast roadways to downtown. The West Seattle Bridge connects to the Spokane Street Viaduct. Add ramps from the Spokane Street Viaduct to the SoDo Busway.

Jan Roberts

206 920 0130

Marilyn Kennell

The Enterprise Initiative promises transparency, accountability, and inclusivity. Sound Transit CEO Constantine's actions, however, indicate that he will (1) protect his idea of brand, (2) micro-manage the headlines, and (3) keep his show on the road at any cost. This type of "management" does not address the budget shortfall, and it corrodes what little public trust remains in Sound Transit.

Board members have a new opportunity (and responsibility) to sincerely "rethink" ST3, which means parting ways with the decades-long status quo. We ask the board to consider (1) voting for the No Build Option on WSLE and (2) rejecting the "need" for a second tunnel. You could reduce the \$35 billion budget gap by \$11 billion simply by killing the WSLE project, and you would restore faith that the board is working independently and in our best interests. No-brainer.

Marilyn Kennell

West Seattle

Lucy Barefoot

Hi,

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. My name is Lucy Barefoot, I am an immigrant of indigenous descent and working mother. I have been a resident of the Avalon neighborhood for 12 yrs and I am a Metro transit user and supporter as my daughter goes to school in White Center since 2017. **I strongly oppose the ST3 West Seattle Extension.** For years, I have been advocating for conscious taxpayer spending when projects do make sense. I have also seen your "outreach" efforts that are a joke. You send staff that seek to collect input from West Seattlelites without leaders or decision makers present to hear and witness the events. Sound transit does not meaningfully engage the community and I have been an active participant since 2019. I remember writing a comment at the top of the easel pad and when staff read it, they quickly turned the page. It was clear that they were only seeking to display "positive comments." The 7.8 billion bill cannot justify the low ridership numbers in the next 20 yrs. I recently learned that the cancellation of the Avalon Station does not have any impact on the overall ridership numbers. How can you justify such expenditure??! If you are so eager to build something, build a new BUS ONLY bridge, road and a tunnel entrance West of Avalon. I voted in 2016 to improve ridership experience, which now means investing or enhancing what we already have. Get back in line with the budget and make the right call for WS instead of risking the funding to build the North to South main vertebrate or any future ST4 plans! I support the NO build option.

Kind regards,

-Lucy Barefoot

Lives in the unceded lands of the Duwamish, still not federally recognized.

Emily Stein on behalf of Leah Ephrem, HEWITT Architects

Written comment for today's Board meeting, for Motion No. M2025-46.
Sending on behalf of Leah Ephrem, HEWITT Architects

The Sound Transit Design MATOC would be life-changing for our firm. Our small-but-mighty team of architects has decades of experience in public transportation design, particularly with Sound Transit, and is deeply committed to the success of our City and community's transportation network. For us, our work as architects in Seattle area's public transportation is not just a job. We are all personally committed to improving our communities through equitable transportation. Until now, our role on Sound Transit projects has been predominantly focused as a subconsultant to large engineering firms. These relationships have granted us wonderful opportunities to provide services for many notable projects including Capitol Hill Station, Northgate Extension, and Eastlink Extension. Fulfilling the role of Prime in future projects will allow us to grow as a firm, be fully engaged, and continue serving Sound Transit and our community on projects for generations to come. The execution of this MATOC would allow us to further expand our ability to serve Sound Transit in ways where we are best able to implement our experience, expertise, and passion for the success of the agency, City, and community.

EMILY STEIN, AIA, LEED AP ND, NCARB

HEWITT

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Maggie Fimia

9.25.25 Testimony from Maggie Fimia, Co-Chair of smartertransit.org.

Please see our smartertransit.org website for more data and documentation.

All good public policy decisions should begin with the question, *Can we get agreement on what is the problem we are trying to solve?* For our region, is it increasing transit ridership and decreasing single occupancy car use? Is it supporting denser, walkable communities with transit? Is it reducing Co2 emissions by decreasing auto use? That question has never been asked or answered except it seems that the problem is we need to build LR. Unfortunately, continuing to plan and build ST3 achieves none of those goals and in fact makes them worse. It especially makes it worse for transit dependent folks who lack frequent service and bus shelters, the environment/sensitive areas, those neighborhoods and businesses tremendously and negatively impacted.

Smartertransit.org is an all volunteer, pro transit, non-partisan, non-profit citizen's organization. Our leadership includes transit and transportation professionals. Many of us voted for Sound Move in 1996. We have been researching, testifying and providing data since 2000.

According to your staff, ST3 is now estimated to cost \$180+ billion. That is before any construction actually takes place. The voters did not vote for this "plan."

We recently updated our Key Performance Measures Report.

Here are a few key performance measures we found in the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC) 2050 Transportation Plan. By 2050:

1. The region sees only a 6% reduction in greenhouse gas (CO2) emissions. The region's goal is an 83% reduction. And that does not factor in life cycle cost to build it.^[1]
2. Traffic grows by 54%.^[2]
3. We will be taking 24,000,000 trips **a day** by car, carpool, transit, ferry, walking and biking. Sound Transit rail and buses will carry only 3% of those trips.^[3] The vast majority will still be by car. Many of those riding LR are existing express bus riders now forced to transfer.

These numbers assume the increased densities being pushed on cities by the Washington State Legislature this session and last. Unfortunately, while the text and photos in their plan sound and look like all is going well, the actual numbers in Appendix H tell a different story.

The ST property, car tab and sales taxes are forever taxes. Currently, they cannot sunset.

The opportunity costs are tremendous. Think what could be accomplished with \$180 Billion.

This issue is sadly, very similar to the WPPSS (Washington Public Power Supply System) issue our region faced in the 1970's. See *history link #5482*

It turns out the cost is the benefit. Hundreds of companies, especially construction, real estate, PR firms, news outlets and non-profits are making thousands and in some cases, billions off of this project. See attachments.

Sound Transit has manipulated the data from the beginning reporting that Buses can't carry as many people as light rail. They restricted the buses to one person per seat and no one standing, while they packed the trains. See Richard Harkness Ph.D report, attached.

Light rail is actually called "light" because of capacity. It is meant for very dense downtown corridors – not to be elevated since it actually is very heavy.

This Enterprise Initiative should be seen as an opportunity to finally ask the critical questions...Can we get agreement on what is the problem we are trying to solve? Who Should Be At The Table and How Do We Honestly Measure Success?

Attachments:

ST Annual Ridership in 2040

2025 Public Disclosure Requests for Payments to non-profits and media – still receiving documents

2016 Public Disclosure Requests for all payments between 2007-2015 over \$100,000

9.25.25 Fimia Testimony

[\[1\]](#) Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC) Regional Transportation Plan Appendix H pg. 7 Figure #1

[\[2\]](#) PSRC 2050 Transportation Plan Appendix H Pg.24 Table 24

[\[3\]](#) PSRC 2050 Plan Appendix H pg.17, Tables 14 & pg. 21 Table 19 combined & Table 3 pg.8 for the Sound Transit proportion of regional transit.

Hello,

Please include this attached document for the Board.

Thank you,

Maggie Fimia

A Citizen's Toolkit, For Repairing or Building a Democracy

<https://maggiefimia.com>

<https://www.linkedin.com/in/margaret-maggie-fimia-094444/>

<https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100084914897899>


Smarter Transit

<https://smartertransit.org>

4665 240th St. SW
Mountlake Terrace WA 98043
mfimia@zipcon.com
206 380 9662 cell

This map illustrates the annual transit ridership volumes in 2040 on each of the seven light rail extensions and the two BRT lines proposed in ST3. Annual system operating costs allocated to each of these ST3 extensions are also shown.

Light Rail and BRT Annual Ridership and Operations Costs (2014\$)



Organization	Dates Req.	Dates Prov.	Payments	Total Amount	Payment for...
Auburn Area Chamber	2015-2025	8.15 - 12.22	8	\$8,000	Premium Membershp
Bellvue Chamber	2015-2025	6.2.16	1	\$5,000	Booths at two events
Bothell Kenmore	2015-2025				
Central Area Chamber	2015-2025				
Economic Alliance of Sno. Co.	2015-2025	6.11.15 - 8.15.24		38 \$204,788.15	
Edmonds Chamber	2015-2025				
Everett Chamber	2015-2025				
Everett Herald	2017-2025				
Kent Chamber of	2015-2025	7.10.18	7	\$1,500.00	Sponsorship+membership
Kent Chamber of		7.10.18		\$2,000	Membership
Kirkland Chamber	2015-2025		2018	\$550	Membership
KUOW	2017-2025				
Lynnwood Chamber	2015-2025				
Opening of Line 2 celebration		2024	2024	\$193,821.03	Opening celebration
One Redmond Foundation	2015-2025	2024 - 2025	2 \$	68,500.00	Community Event Fund x2
Puget Sound Sage	2015-2025	2018 - 2019	3 \$	8,500.00	Celebrations/Sponsor
Seattle Chamber	2015-2025	2022-2023	2	\$25,505.00	Membership
Seattle City Club	2015 - 2025				
Seattle Times	2017-2025	2017-2023	94 \$	159,788.92	
Shoreline Chamber	2015-2025				
Tacoma Chamber	2015-2025				
Tacoma News	2017-2025	2019 - 2021	20 \$	14,002.40	
Tacoma News Tribune	2017-2025	2017-2023	38 \$	23,807.75	
Transportation Choices Coalition	2022-2024	2022-24	3 \$	150,000.00	
West Seattle Chamber	2015-2025				

Highlighted yellow are ones we are still waiting for.

Most also have not given us the numbers for all the years requested. These request were made on June 12, 2025

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

Vendor Name	Amount Total	Location	Category
ANTI, INC	192,000		Art
C/LAW STUDIO	118,289		Art
HADDAD DRUGAN LLC	483,000	Seattle	Art
LEO SAUL BERK	159,380	Seattle	Art
META ARTE LLC	108,500	Seattle	Art
SEA REACH LTD	149,475	Oregon	Art
TUBE ART DISPLAYS INC	3,317,800	Seattle	Art
PACIFIC AIR CONTROL INC	391,826	Bothell	Building Maintenance
ALEXANDER DENNIS INC.	4,358,100		Bus Supplier
GILLIG CORPORATION	40,033,646	California	Bus Supplier
MOTOR COACH INDUSTRIES, INC	9,717,742		Bus Supplier
NEW FLYER INDUSTRIES (US CORP)	97,939,383		Bus Supplier
BNSF	6,211,041		Bus/Rail Service
BNSF FIELD OFFICE	356,256		Bus/Rail Service
COMMUNITY TRANSIT	90,906,397	Everett	Bus/Rail Service
KING COUNTY ACCTS RECEIVABLE	485,075,399	King County	Bus/Rail Service
KING COUNTY METRO – RFCS OPS	1,973,257	King County	Bus/Rail Service
KING COUNTY RADIO COMMUNICATION	1,033,644	King County	Bus/Rail Service
KING COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE	54,657,356	King County	Bus/Rail Service
PIERCE TRANSIT	202,487,332	Pierce Co	Bus/Rail Service
WSDOT PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION & R	63,027,138	Olympia	Bus/Rail Service
	905,727,819		
BUD CLARY CHEVROLET	225,075	Longview	Car Fleet
CMARR AUTOMOTIVE	113,197	Seattle	Car Fleet
COLUMBIA FORD	487,316	Longview	Car Fleet
ENTERPRISE RENT A CAR	167,631		Car Fleet
FLEET BODY EQUIPMENT	100,778	Texas	Car Fleet

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

HONDA AUTO CENTER OF BELLEVUE	105,451	Bellevue	Car Fleet
LEGACY FORD	117,259	La Grande OR?	Car Fleet
	1,316,707		
BUENAVISTA SERVICES, INC	3,119,964	Lake Forest Park	Cleaning Services
CLEAN & HAPPY	1,989,323	Tacoma	Cleaning Services
GOODBYE GRAFFITI SEATTLE	200,739	Seattle	Cleaning Services
JOHN HART JET PRESSUREWASH & CL	427,747	Tukwila	Cleaning Services
OB-JOHN HART JET PRESSUREWASH &	129,643	Tukwila	Cleaning Services
ABB, INC.	419,562	Tacoma	Construction
ABSHER CONSTRUCTION CO.	16,879,813	Puyallup	Construction
ADVANCED CONSTRUCTION INC	357,055	unknown	Construction
ADVANCED DRILLING LLC	180,382	Rochester WA	Construction
ALTEC INDUSTRIES INC	631,643	unknown	Construction
BAYLEY CONSTRUCTION	6,911,162	Shoreline	Construction
BLACK'S CARPENTRY INC	851,822		Construction
BURTON CONSTRUCTION INC	120,281		Construction
CA CAREY CORP.	10,394,172	Issaquah	Construction
CADENCE CONSTRUCTION	586,341	Seattle	Construction
CAVEMAN CARPENTRY	400,636	Renton	Construction
CENTENNIAL CONTRACTORS ENTERPR	8,000,183	Virginia	Construction
CLEAR CONSCEINCE SEALANTS, LLC	142,435		Construction
CLK CONSTRUCTION LLC	100,091		Construction
COMBINED CONSTRUCTION INC	247,708		Construction
CONSTRUCT COMPANY LLC	1,728,353	Illinois	Construction
DANNEKO CONSTRUCTION	122,783	Kirkland	construction
ELCON CORPORATION	1,507,259	Everett	Construction
EXPRESS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY I	155,332	Bellevue	Construction
FABTECH MFG. LLC	145,562	Everett	Construction

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

FORMA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY	16,021,203	Seattle	Construction
FRANK COLUCCIO CONSTRUCTION CO	210,820	Seattle	Construction
GARY MERLINO CONSTRUCTION	10,143,964	Seattle	Construction
GRANITE NORTHWEST	16,666,959		Construction
HARBOR PACIFIC/GRAHAM JOINT VENT	31,181,502		Construction
HOFFMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY	150,945,597	Seattle	Construction
INCO	100,092		Construction
INTERTRAN CORPORATION	162,705	PA	Construction
JCM NORTHLINK LLC	443,948,647		Construction
JCM U-LINK JOINT VENTURE	157,313,262		Construction
JEM CONTRACTORS	3,653,935	Burien	Construction
JOHANSEN EXCAVATING INC	8,458,838	Buckley WA	Construction
KBA, INC	11,176,232	Bellevue	Construction
KEMPER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATIO	778,534	Redmond	Construction
LEAJAK CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION, IN	1,392,000	Mountlake Terrace	Construction
MAD CONSTRUCTION LLC	1,250,299	Spanaway	Construction
METRO PAINTING LLC	453,608	Seattle	Construction
MIDMOUNTAIN CONTRACTORS INC	70,460,092	Kirkland	Construction
MIDVALE ELECTRIC, INC	843,035	Sunnyside WA	Construction
MILRAIL, INC.	259,646	Canada	Construction
MOON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY	108,732	Lynnwood	Construction
MORTENSON CONSTRUCTION	1,380,344	Seattle	Construction
MOWAT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY	75,343,148	Woodinville	Construction
NC POWER SYSTEMS CO.	1,554,211	Tuckwila	Construction
NORDIC CONSTRUCTION INC	2,020,154	Fife	Construction
NORTHWEST CONSTRUCTION	829,952	Seattle	Construction
OB-Chnged to 66583 NETVERSANT POW	1,142,509	Seattle	Construction
PCL CIVIL CONSTRUCTORS INC	173,417,320	Seattle	Construction

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

PCL CONSTRUCTION SERVICES INC	17,570,782	Seattle	Construction
PEASE CONSTRUCTION INC	3,459,056	Lakewood	Construction
PELLCO CONSTRUCTION, INC	3,806,549	Mulkiteo	Construction
PILCHUCK DIVERSIFIED SERVICES	2,345,253	Bothell	Construction
R&R CONSTRUCTION LLC	104,587	Unknown	Construction
RAILWORKS TRACK SYSTEMS, INC	51,695,313	Chehlis	Construction
SCHEIDT & BACHMANN USA INC	13,965,573	MA	construction
SCI INFRASTRUCTURE, LLC	29,476,135	SeaTac	Construction
SEATTLE TUNNEL & RAIL TEAM (START	68,789,000	Seattle	Construction
SELLEN SUSTAINABILITY LLC	141,325	Seattle	Construction
STACY AND WITBECK, INC	130,842,608		Construction
STACY AND WITBECK/ATKINSON JOINT	2,510,215		Construction
TECSTONE GRANITE USA, LTD	130,995	Ohio	Construction
TITAN EARTHWORK LLC	4,297,675	Sumner	Construction
TRAYLOR FRONTIER-KEMPER	315,202,136	Seattle	Construction
TURNER CONSTRUCTION CO	111,522,243	Seattle	Construction
VETCH CONSTRUCTION, LLC	335,609	Camano Is	Construction
VOESTALPINE NORTRAK INC.	175,476		Construction
WALSH CONSTRUCTION CO. II LLC	9,389,382	Chicago	Construction
WILDER CONSTRUCTION CO.	6,386,182	Everett?	Construction
ADVANCED RAIL MANAGEMENT CORPO	505,283	Florida	Consultant
AGREEMENT DYNAMICS INC	199,820	Seattle	Consultant
CAMBRIDGE SYSTEMATICS INC	884,558		Consultant
CASE FORENSICS CORPORATION	190,524	Mulkiteo	Consultant
COMMSTRUCTURE CONSULTING, LLC	203,742	Oregon	Consultant
DENALI ADVANCED INTEGRATION	1,801,989	Redmond	Consultant
ERM WEST INC.	129,998	Seattle	Consultant
HILL INTERNATIONAL INC	898,636	Seattle	Consultant

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

HR LOGISTICS LLC	130,000	NC	Consultant
JOHNSON CONTROLS INC	213,101	Seattle	Consultant
MICHAEL MINOR & ASSOCIATES, INC.	424,688	Portland	Consultant
NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC	548,000	Seattle	Consultant
NRC ENVIRONMENTAL	4,386,667	Seattle	Consultant
PALADINO AND COMPANY INC.	500,000	Seattle	Consultant
POINT B, INC.	462,160	Seattle	Consultant
PROSPECT DELTA	346,000	Seattle	Consultant
PUBLIC SECTOR PERSONNEL CONSULTING	160,500	AZ	Consultant
RAUL V BRAVO & ASSOCIATES INC	463,980	Reston	Consultant
RESOURCE SYSTEMS GROUP INC	630,000	Several	Consultant
SCONTRINO-POWELL	119,875	Seattle	Consultant
SHELLY BROWN ASSOCIATES LLC	172,500	Seattle	Consultant
STEER DAVIES & GLEAVE, INC	554,690	Vanc. BC	Consultant
WATERSHED ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS	931,236	Toledo WA	Consultant
ANTHRO-TECH INC.	2,145,750	Olympia	Consultants
ECONORTHWEST	150,000	Seattle	Consultants
FEHR & PEERS	1,918,334	Seattle	Consultants
GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE ADVISORS	210,000	New York	Consultants
MCKINSTRY CO	514,140	Seattle	Consultants
MENG ANALYSIS	1,700,000	Seattle	Consultants
MGT OF AMERICA INC.	150,000	Olympia	Consultants
RESTORATION LOGISTICS LLC	1,537,739	Seattle	Consultants
SPRINGWOOD ASSOCIATES, INC.	1,104,400	Seattle	Consultants
TRANSPO GROUP	207,429	Kirkland	Consultants
ATHENA GROUP, LLC (THEO)	193,333	Olympia	Consulting
	24,689,073		
NONSTOP INC	601,500		Delivery Service

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

MTC TRANSFORMERS INC.	135,128	Virginia	Electric
FULLER ELECTRIC INC.	318,000	Federal Way	Electrical
PLATT ELECTRIC SUPPLY, INC - BEAVE	308,577	Beaverton	Electrical
POTELCO INC	560,577	Sumner	Electrical
SCHAFFNER MTC TRANSFORMERS	190,156		Electrical
SEQUOYAH ELECTRIC, LLC	255,861	Redmond	Electrical
STUSSER ELECTRIC CO. (CED)	315,932	Seattle	Electrical
TRANSTECH OF SC, INC	299,633	South Carolina	Electrical
TRANSTECHNIK CORP USA	219,000	Georgia	Electrical
WEST VALLEY ELECTRIC, LLC	100,641	Maple Valley	Electrical
WOOJIN IS AMERICA INC	362,378	CA	Electrical
WPCS INTERNATIONAL - SEATTLE INC	223,789	Redmond	Electrical
MOTOROLA, INC	1,480,213		Electronics
ELTEC SYSTEMS, LLC	1,031,068	Snolqualmie	Elevators
KONE, INC.	134,729	Redmond	Elevators
THYSSENKRUPP ELEVATOR CORPORA	262,503	Seattle	Elevators
AMERESCO QUANTUM	1,196,329	Renton	Energy
ARMAND CONSULTING INC	1,236,884	Issaquah	Engineering
ARUP NORTH AMERICA, LTD	100,216		Engineering
BOLIMA DRAFTING AND DESIGN, INC	2,000,000	Seattle	Engineering
CDM SMITH INC	3,840,650	Seattle	Engineering
CH2MHILL	7,964,585		Engineering
CONDON-JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, INC	23,548,031	Seattle	Engineering
DAVID EVANS & ASSOCIATES	13,531,527	Seattle	Engineering
DELCAN CORPORATION	150,000		Engineering
DKS ASSOCIATES	136,466	Seattle	Engineering
DODD CONSULTING	275,000	Bellevue	Engineering
GEOENGINEERS, INC	3,840,650	Seattle	Engineering

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

H-J-H FINAL DESIGN PARTNERS	93,136,362		Engineering
HARRIS & ASSOCIATES	6,640,815	Seattle	Engineering
HATCH MOTT MACDONALD	13,218,955	Seattle	Engineering
HDR ENGINEERING, INC.	40,171,526	Edmonds	Engineering
HNTB CORPORATION	5,850,000	Bellevue	Engineering
HUITT-ZOLLARS, INC.	22,832,249	Seattle	Engineering
JACOBS ASSOCIATES CONSTRUCTION	92,266,409	Seattle	Engineering
KPFF CONSULTING ENGINEERS INC	6,800,000	Seattle	Engineering
Lamoreaux, McLendon & Associates	250,631	Utah/CA	Engineering
LIN & ASSOCIATES	1,515,451	Seattle	Engineering
LTK ENGINEERING SERVICES - CORPO	39,665,480	Seattle	Engineering
LTK ENGINEERING SERVICES - SEATTLE	8,343,755	Seattle	Engineering
NORTH CORRIDOR TRANSIT PARTNERS	40,783,845		Engineering
NORTH SEATTLE TUNNEL & RAIL (NOR	75,662,622		Engineering
OB-INCA ENGINEERS- Changed to 68683	873,815	Bellevue	Engineering
PARAMETRIX INC	7,026,849	Seattle	Engineering
PARSONS BRINCKERHOFF	102,679,870	UK	Engineering
PORTER & ASSOCIATES	190,000	CA	Engineering
RAIL SYSTEMS, INC	229,332	Kentucky	Engineering
SHANNON & WILSON INC	9,890,750	Seattle	Engineering
SPECTRUM DESIGN	665,000	Local	Engineering
STUDIO MENG STRAZZARA, INC P.S.	957,936	Seattle	Engineering
URS CORPORATION - DEPT 5964	855,387		Engineering
URS CORPORATION (Seattle)	698,194		Engineering
WALDRON INC	150,000		Engineering
BELL HARBOR CONFERENCE CENTER	297,370	Seattle	Events
THE WORKSHOP	712,500	Seattle	Events
CONWAY & ASSOCIATES	160,000	Seattle	Finance

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

DAVIDSON FIXED INCOME MANAGEMENT	500,000	Unkown	Finance
KPMG LLP	4,169,089	Seattle	Finance
KRAGHT SNELL, PS	1,550,000		Finance
MAUS-WAGNER LLC	700,000	Seattle	Finance
MCGLADREY, LLP	150,000	Seattle	Finance
MILLER & MILLER, P. S.	150,000	Seattle	Finance
MONTAGUE DEROSE & ASSOCIATES, L	480,000	CA	Finance
MOSS ADAMS LLP	554,900	Seattle	Finance
OB-GALLAGHER BENEFIT SVC-Chg to 70	190,500	Seattle	Finance
PROTIVITI. INC	700,000	Seattle	Finance
PUBLIC FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT	925,000	Seattle	Finance
WELLS FARGO BANK	4,046,690		Finance
	14,276,179		
GREAT FLOORS	192,708	Lynnwood	flooring
HMI-TI, INC	373,751	Seattle	flooring
GROAT BROS INC	167,617	Woodland	Freight transport
MORAN INDUSTRIES INC	998,995	IL	Freight transport
VALLEY FREIGHTLINER, INC	916,182		Freight transport
OLYMPIC PIPE LINE COMPANY	601,935		Fuel?
MBI SYSTEMS, INC	1,991,017	Seattle	Furniture
OPEN SQUARE	351,528	Seattle	Furniture
SEDIA INC.	4,658,427	Boston	Furniture
SPACESAVER NORTHWEST	171,705	Seattle	Furniture
	7,172,677		
BELLEVUE, CITY OF	1,200,000	Bellevue	Govt.
BURKE MUSEUM (UW)	135,200	Seattle	Govt.
CITY OF EVERETT/EVERETT STATION	737,481	Everett	Govt.
CITY OF TACOMA	1,212,349	Tacoma	Govt.

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

CITY OF TACOMA PUBLIC WORKS	610,000	Tacoma	Govt.
DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY	226,772	Olympia	Govt.
DEPARTMENT OF ENTERPRISE SERVICES	121,575	Olympia	Govt.
EVERETT, CITY OF	166,658	Everett	Govt.
FEDERAL WAY, CITY OF	128,196	Federal Way	Govt.
ISSAQUAH, CITY OF	400,000	Issaquah	Govt.
KING COUNTY	14,730,000	King County	Govt.
KING COUNTY DEPT OF FINANCE	896,935	King County	Govt.
KING COUNTY FINANCE	205,000	King County	Govt.
KING COUNTY FINANCE & OPERATIONS	800,000	King County	Govt.
KING COUNTY TREASURY	140,000	King County	Govt.
KING COUNTY WATER & LAND RESOURCES	573,056	King County	Govt.
KIRKLAND, CITY OF	5,102,764	Kirkland	Govt.
LAKEWOOD, CITY OF	1,000,000	Lakewood	Govt.
MARYSVILLE, CITY OF	1,691,000	Marysville	Govt.
NEWCASTLE, CITY OF	4,000,000	Newcastle	Govt.
PIERCE COUNTY BUDGET & FINANCE DEPT	406,892	Pierce Co	Govt.
PORT OF SEATTLE	9,897,292	Seattle	Govt.
PUGET SOUND ENERGY	153,918	Bellevue	Govt.
PUGET SOUND ENERGY(Bellevue)	3,961,998	Bellevue	Govt.
PUGET SOUND REGIONAL COUNCIL	1,328,407	Seattle	Govt.
PUYALLUP, CITY OF	172,945	Puyallup	Govt.
REDMOND (CITY OF)	2,751,309	Redmond	Govt.
RENTON, CITY OF	140,000	Renton	Govt.
SEATAC CITY OF	1,313,129	SeaTac	Govt.
SEATAC, CITY OF (188 TH ST)	6,533,806	SeaTac	Govt.
SEATTLE CITY LIGHT	450,000	Seattle	Govt.
SEATTLE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION	216,000	Seattle	Govt.

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

SEATTLE MAILING BUREAU	197,280	Seattle	Govt.
SEATTLE PUBLIC UTILITIES	3,500,000	Seattle	Govt.
SEATTLE PUBLIC UTILITIES (BOX #3401	266,000	Seattle	Govt.
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1	140,000	Seattle	Govt.
SEATTLE, CITY OF - DIT	160,000	Seattle	Govt.
SEATTLE, CITY OF - DOT	187,750,482	Seattle	Govt.
SEATTLE, CITY OF - FINANCE DIVISION	1,470,427	Seattle	Govt.
SEATTLE, CITY OF - PLANNING & DEV	1,215,000	Seattle	Govt.
Tacoma Water-Engineering	130,000	Tacoma	Govt.
TACOMA, CITY OF	1,450,000	Tacoma	Govt.
TACOMA, CITY OF - TREASURER	621,754	Tacoma	Govt.
TUKWILA, CITY OF	236,452	Tukwila	Govt.
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON	15,352,000	Seattle	Govt.
UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON(Chicago)	105,000	Seattle	Govt.
UW - CAPITAL PROJECTS OFFICE ACCO	2,350,000	Seattle	Govt.
WA DEPT OF INFO SERVICES	4,251,329	Olympia	Govt.
WA STATE DEPT OF LICENSING	3,243,500	Olympia	Govt.
WA STATE DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION	187,197,507	Olympia	Govt.
WASHINGTON STATE DEPT OF TRANSP	10,290,845	Olympia	Govt.
WSDOT	1,021,050	Olympia	Govt.
	482,351,310		
GRAINGER	1,457,542	Seattle	industrial supplies
NELECO INC	109,500	NC	industrial supplies
AON RISK SERVICES	2,255,000	Seattle	Insurance
CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE	2,632,865		Insurance
CS STARS LLC	197,736	Texas	Insurance
EVERGREEN HEALTHCARE	453,630	Kirkland	Insurance
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE	460,414		Insurance

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

GALLAGHER BENEFIT SERVICES, INC	808,000	Seattle	Insurance
PBC INC	1,173,757	NJ	Insurance
WILLIS OF SEATTLE INC	2,625,222	Seattle	Insurance
WILLIS OF TEXAS, INC.	24,530,500	Texas	Insurance
	35,137,124		
GOVERNMENT PORTFOLIO ADVISORS	686,916	Portland	Investing
HEWITT ENNISKNUPP, INC	103,000		Investing
HYAS GROUP LLC	117,000	Portland	Investing
PIPER JAFFRAY	479,000	Seattle	Investing
	1,385,916		
ACCESS INFORMATION MANAGEMENT	956,135	SeaTac?	IT
BROCADE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS	496,475	San Jose	IT
CANON FINANCIAL SERVICES INC	206,051		IT
CARAHSOFT TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION	308,380	Virginia	IT
CDWG LLC	917,611		IT
CENTURYLINK(Seattle-Box 91155)	184,056	Issaquah	IT
COMDATA NETWORK	1,756,000		IT
COMPUCOM SYSTEMS INC	2,137,200		IT
COMPVIEW	202,796	Seattle	IT
COPIERS NORTHWEST INC	2,775,207	Everett	IT
CTS	142,480		IT
DELL MARKETING LP	6,623,918		IT
DILAX SYSTEMS	867,356		IT
DUNCAN KENT & ASSOCIATES	175,000	BC	IT
EBID SYSTEMS	168,600	Bainbridge	IT
ESTRADA CONSULTING INC.	402,250	Sacramento	IT
IMMIXTECHNOLOGY	419,440	VA	IT
LBL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERS	602,726	MN	IT

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LCPTRACKER INC	153,440	CA	IT
LEVEL 3 COMMUNICATIONS LLC	253,313	Seattle	IT
MACRO CCS INC	136,620	Bellevue	IT
MCI COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC	577,013	GA	IT
METEORCOMM LLC	430,693	Renton	IT
OB-Changed to 65486 ORACLE USA, INC	432,028		IT
OLYMPIA TECHNOLOGY GROUP	104,625	Olympia	IT
ORACLE AMERICA INC	1,031,814		IT
POWERCOM INC	147,960	Bothell	IT
QUESTICA INC	1,173,744	Ontario	IT
RIGHT SYSTEMS INC	546,986	Bellevue	IT
RK2 ADVISORY LLC	199,000	Seattle	IT
SOFTCHOICE CORPORATION	197,280	Seattle	IT
TAPIA PRODUCTIONS, INC.	141,120	Seattle	IT
TELELANGUAGE, INC	149,189		IT
TELVENT FARRADYNE INC.	198,606	MD	IT
TRAPEZE SOFTWARE GROUP, LLC	2,521,924	Multiple	IT
VIX TECHNOLOGY USA INC	8,927,759		IT
WORLD WIDE TECHNOLOGY INC.	291,076	Kent	IT
XIOLOGIX LLC	161,622	Oregon	IT
ZONES, INC	100,722	Auburn	IT
CANON SOLUTIONS AMERICA INC.	148,018		IT
ICF JONES & STOKES INC	190,380	Seattle	IT
LETIGRE SOLUTIONS INC	2,171,808	Seattle	IT
	39,728,421		
COASTWIDE LABS	241,585		Janitorial
QUILITE INTERNATIONAL	322,361		Janitorial?
MAYER/REED	232,365	Portland	Landscaping

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NORTHWEST LANDSCAPE SERVICES CO	630,877	Woodinville	Landscaping
PACIFIC EARTH WORKS INC	403,590	Monroe	Landscaping
PLANTSCAPES INC	402,400	Seattle	Landscaping
TOTAL LANDSCAPE CORPORATION	747,766	Woodinville	Landscaping
VINSON BROTHERS CORPORATION	1,382,057	Seattle	Landscaping
BEAN, GENTRY, WHEELER & PETERNE	110,500	Olympia	Legal
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP	934,000	Seattle	Legal
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP	340,000	Seattle	Legal
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP	122,000	Wisconsin	Legal
FOSTER PEPPER PLLC	1,673,298	Seattle	Legal
GENESIS LAW FIRM PLLC	200,000	Everett	Legal
GORDONDERR LLP	131,000	Seattle	Legal
K&L GATES	2,915,000	Seattle	Legal
KAPLAN KIRSCH & ROCKWELL LLP	275,000	Denver/Washington D	Legal
LANE POWELL PC	2,314,551	Seattle	Legal
MILLER NASH GRAHAM & DUNN LLP	8,290,432	Seattle	Legal
PACIFICA LAW GROUP LLP	915,000	Seattle	Legal
PERKINS, COIE LLP	14,377,914	Seattle	Legal
SAVITT & BRUCE LLP	260,000	Seattle	Legal
STOEL RIVES, LLP	141,000	Seattle	Legal
THOMAS ELI BACKER, ATTORNEY AT L	1,035,000	Bainbridge	Legal
WILSON, SMITH, COCHRAN & DICKERS	425,000	Seattle	Legal
	34,459,695		
ANSALDO STS USA, INC.	335,136		LR Vehicles and Track
BOMBARDIER TRANSIT CORPORATION	31,402,967		LR Vehicles and Track
ELECTRO-MOTIVE DIESEL, INC	16,732,325		LR Vehicles and Track
FAIVELEY TRANSPORT USA, INC	465,800		LR Vehicles and Track
KINKISHARYO INTERNATIONAL, LLC	3,917,236		LR Vehicles and Track

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

KNORR BRAKE CORPORATION	2,428,957		LR Vehicles and Track
LORAM MAINTENANCE OF WAY, INC	209,265	MN	LR Vehicles and Track
MOTIVEPOWER INC	14,740,643		LR Vehicles and Track
PENN MACHINE COMPANY	643,384	PA	LR Vehicles and Track
SIEMENS INDUSTRY INC (WA)	353,652		LR Vehicles and Track
SIEMENS INDUSTRY INC (IL) IMO PROP	700,541		LR Vehicles and Track
WABTEC RAILWAY ELECTRONICS	34,157,163		LR Vehicles and Track
US POSTAL SERVICE	1,903,701		Mail Services
CATHOLIC COMMUNITY SERVICES -	107,837		Non Profit
HOPELINK	163,246	Shoreline	Non profit
SEATTLE VOCATIONAL INSTITUTE	125,000	Seattle	Non profit
	396,083		
IKON OFFICE SOLUTIONS	3,125,904	Bellevue?	office equipment
KEENEY'S OFFICE SUPPLY, INC.	1,427,666	Redmond	office equipment
MAGNUM PRINT SOLUTIONS	201,191	Seattle	office equipment
QUALITY BUSINESS SYSTEMS INC	1,589,200	Bellevue	office equipment
	6,343,962		
OFFICE DEPOT	150,826		Office Supplies
XEROX FINANCIAL SERVICES LLC	1,356,825		Office Supplies
AT&T	541,369		Phone
AD CLUB	949,235	California	PR/Ad
BBC RESEARCH & CONSULTING	245,000	Denver	PR/Ad
CAPITOL HILL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE	610,000	Seattle	PR/Ad
CASCADIA CONSULTING GROUP INC.	2,550,000	Seattle	PR/Ad
CBS RADIO	606,105		PR/Ad
CLEAR CHANNEL AIRPORTS	123,000		PR/Ad
CLEAR CHANNEL OUTDOOR	220,000		PR/Ad
CLEAR CHANNEL OUTDOOR / IMAGING	200,000		PR/Ad

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COCKER/FENNESSY, INC.	694,743	Seattle	PR/Ad
COMCAST SPOTLIGHT	225,290		PR/Ad
CONSOLIDATED PRESS	1,631,724	Spokane	PR/Ad
DESIGN ONE	250,550	Seattle	PR/Ad
EMC RESEARCH INC	2,903,243	Seattle	PR/Ad
ENTERCOM COMMUNICATIONS CORP	400,000	Seattle	PR/Ad
ENVIROISSUES	2,476,900	Seattle	PR/Ad
FASTSIGNS OF LYNNWOOD	117,547	Lynnwood	PR/Ad
FISHER RADIO SEATTLE	300,000	Seattle	PR/Ad
FRAUSE GROUP	152,395	Seattle	PR/Ad
GREENRUBINO, INC.	9,656,015	Seattle	PR/Ad
IMAGESOURCE	122,269	Kirkland	PR/Ad
K/P CORPORATION	201,186	Renton	Pr/Ad
KCPQ -TV	118,000	Seattle	PR/Ad
KING TV	751,408	Seattle	PR/Ad
KIRO TV	335,670	Seattle	PR/Ad
KOMO TV	269,787	Seattle	PR/Ad
LACY & PAR INC	483,304	Seattle	PR/Ad
MARTIN FLYNN PUBLIC AFFAIRS INC	484,000	Olympia	PR/Ad
MCBEE STRATEGIC CONSULTING LLC	3,738,866	Washington DC	PR/Ad
NEWS TRIBUNE	103,000	Tacoma	PR/Ad
NORTHWEST PUBLISHING CENTER LLC	315,647	Tukwila	PR/Ad
OB-CLEAR CHANNEL RADIO-Chg to 704	440,400		PR/Ad
OB-TITAN OUTDOOR LLC	190,000	Seattle	PR/Ad
OPINION RESEARCH NORTHWEST	648,565	Seattle	PR/Ad
PRINTING CONTROL SERVICES	111,101	Tukwilla	PR/Ad
ROOT SPORTS NW	555,100		PR/Ad
SEATTLE SEAHAWKS	1,369,665	Seattle	PR/Ad

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SEATTLE SOUNDERS FC	343,892	Seattle	PR/Ad
SEATTLE TIMES	800,000	Seattle	PR/Ad
SLALOM CONSULTING	1,365,125	Seattle	PR/Ad
SOAPBOX COMMUNICATIONS INC	165,000	Seattle	PR/Ad
THOMSON REUTERS	193,556	NY	PR/Ad
TITAN OUTDOOR HOLDINGS LLC	109,600		PR/Ad
TOTAL TRAFFIC NETWORK	126,490	unknown	PR/Ad
	37,653,380		
ALLEN BRACKETT SHEDD	3,804,501	Seattle	Real Estate
MCKEE & SCHALKA REAL ESTATE APPR	5,833,074	Seattle	Real Estate
RED CEDAR PARTNERS, LLC	175,000	Chicago IL	Real Estate
SELIG FAMILY HOLDINGS, LLC	100,006	Seattle	Real Estate
UNIVERSAL FIELD SERVICES	22,228,000	Edmonds	Real Estate
VALBRIDGE PROP ADV /ALLEN BRACKETT	2,025,100	Seattle	Real Estate
CIC VALUATION GROUP INC	2,025,100	Bellevue	RealEstate
KIDDER MATHEWS	702,350	Seattle	RealEstate
	36,893,132		
ALARMCO, INC	121,349	Las Vegas	Safety/Security
APOLLO VIDEO TECHNOLOGY	369,547	Bothell	Safety/Security
ARONSON SECURITY GROUP	1,624,444	Renton	Safety/Security
CEI GROUP INC.	100,091	PA	Safety/Security
DUNBAR ARMORED INC.	4,205,000		Safety/Security
INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC MACHIN	4,895,251		Safety/Security
OB-SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES U	35,044,574	Bellevue	Safety/Security
RED HAWK FIRE & SECURITY	196,541	Bothell	Safety/Security
SAFEWARE INC	630,200	Maryland	Safety/Security
SEATTLE, CITY OF - POLICE DEPT	427,640	Seattle	Safety/Security
SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES USA,	41,422,000	Bellevue	Safety/Security

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SETRACON, INC	433,224	Tacoma	Safety/Security
SIMPLEXGRINNELL	397,900	Seattle	Safety/Security
TIP TOP SERVICES, INC	134,923	Renton	Safety/Security
TRANSIT SAFETY & SECURITY SOLUTIONS	149,506	Texas	Safety/Security
US FIRE EQUIPMENT LLC	100,091	Sumner	Safety/Security
	90,252,281		
TALKING SIGNS SERVICES	2,176,085	San Francisco	Signage
YESCO LLC	1,235,325	Tacoma	Signage
ACCOUNTANTS INC	200,000	Seattle	Staffing
ADVANTAGE HUMAN RESOURCING, INC	200,000	Unknown	Staffing
AEROTEK INC	300,000	Local	Staffing
APPLEONE EMPLOYMENT SERVICES	828,478	Seattle	Staffing
ATWORK!	2,763,724	Bellevue	Staffing
CBS PERSONNEL SERVICES LLC	200,000		Staffing
CENTERFORCE	414,212	Lakewood	Staffing
GREYTHORN, INC	209,146	Bellevue	Staffing
HALLCON CORPORATION (US CORP)	6,740,810	Toronto?	Staffing
HANSELL TIERNEY INC	669,459	Mercer Island	Staffing
KL EXECUTIVE SEARCH LLC	130,000	Seattle	Staffing
KL2 CONNECTS LLC	200,000	Seattle	Staffing
LANDMARK EVENT STAFFING SERVICE	131,522	Seattle	Staffing
PARKER STAFFING SERVICES, LLC	558,667	Seattle	Staffing
ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL INC	440,361	Lynnwood	Staffing
SEAPORT HR CONSULTING	600,000	Redmond	Staffing
SILKROAD TECHNOLOGY INC	100,088	Chicago	Staffing
SMART TALENT, LLC	200,000	Lynnwood	Staffing
SOS STAFFING SERVICES INC	200,000	Seattle	Staffing
SRI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.	297,721	Seattle	Staffing

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STAFFMARK	200,000	Auburn	Staffing
TECHSTAFF INC	528,200	Seattle	Staffing
TRIPLNET TECHNOLOGIES, INC.	590,392	Seattle	Staffing
VOLT SERVICES GROUP (BELLEVUE)	261,650	Bellvue	Staffing
VOLT WORKFORCE SOLUTIONS(TUKWILA)	300,000	Bellevue	Staffing
	17,264,429		
FASTENAL COMPANY	100,091	Edmonds	Supplies
QUALITY INN & SUITES	631,714		Travel
ARAMARK UNIFORM SERVICES (PASADENA)	443,594		Uniforms
BLUMENTHAL UNIFORM	1,299,152		Uniforms
KROESEN'S UNIFORMS, INC.	101,360		Uniforms
ADVENTAG, LLC	198,000		unknown
CLEARPOINT LP	181,800		unknown
CRAWFORD DOOR COMPANY LLC	312,468	Lynnwood	unknown
CUTTER INC	502,571		unknown
E. G. FRISBY LLC	152,294		Unknown
ESA	8,094,275		unknown
FHL SPC ONE INC	200,000		unknown
GRAYBAR ELECTRIC	343,335	Several in area	unknown
KCDA PURCHASING COOPERATIVE	1,164,668	seattle	unknown
MICROSOFT CORPORATION	2,123,055	Redmond	unknown
NOBISK LLC	102,511		unknown
NORTH, JANE	261,500		unknown
OB-AMX INTERNATIONAL-Changed to 58	346,030		unknown
OB-MRP SERVICES	129,466		unknown
RHEINMETALL CANADA INC	380,174	Canada	unknown
WR-SRI 120TH NORTH, LLC	147,000	Delaware	unknown
ACTION SERVICES CORPORATION	1,192,824	Tacoma	Waste Management

Sound Transit Spending Subtotals 2007-2014 over \$100,000

[illegible]

How Sound Transit (Seattle, Washington) Abused the Planning Process to Promote Light Rail Transit

by [Richard C. Harkness](#), Ph.D.

January, 2005

Extended Summary

The main purpose of this report is to trigger a reconsideration of Sound Transit's light rail plans, and the FTA's willingness to fund them by challenging the fundamental basis for Sound Transit's entire rail-centric strategy including their recently released Draft Long-Range Plan. A secondary purpose is to trigger improvements to the planning process that will: 1) help ensure taxpayers get the most "bang for the buck" from their investments in transportation, and 2) eliminate deceptive and manipulative practices on the part of agencies such as Sound Transit. Still a third objective is to give planning students and citizens in other cities a case study example of ways in which a transit agency has abused the planning process in order to promote a favored outcome.

There are three key reasons Sound Transits light rail strategy should be reconsidered:

- 1) Link light rail costs too much for what little it accomplishes. At the same time there appear to be better alternatives such as Bus Rapid Transit (BRT).
- 2) Sound Transit has never proven in any logical or business-like manner that Link is superior to these other alternatives.
- 3) Decisions to approve Link have been based on incomplete, misleading, biased, and false information which Sound Transit disseminated in order to garner support for its light rail plan.

These observations are not new. Sound Transit has heard, and ignored, them many times before. What this report adds to the record is a detailed and carefully footnoted analysis of how Sound Transit has abused the planning process to promote light rail, and, for the first time, a dollar estimate of just what pursuit of Sound Transit's light rail strategy would probably cost this region in relation to a bus rapid transit (BRT) alternative.

In short, the reader of this report will be privy to information that has not been available to date. It will show that the emperor (Sound Transit) has no clothes as regards its rationale for proceeding with light rail.

The full story of Sound Transit's abuse of the planning process is beyond the scope of this report. This report focuses on the alternatives analysis and environmental impact study (EIS) that supposedly justified the choice of rail technology over bus technology for this region's mass transit backbone. The alternatives analysis and closely related EIS are equivalent to a "business case" in the transportation-planning arena. They provide just about the only cost and performance information available to those trying to decide whether or not to fund projects like Link.

Background and context

The Puget Sound Region is becoming committed to a light rail-centric strategy. Sound Transit recently began construction on Link's 14-mile "Initial Segment". Sound Transit's Board is already committed to extending it to Northgate, although they lack the money. In addition, Sound Transit has just published a Draft Long-Range plan which envisions extending Link into a regional system over 125 miles long. Over two billion dollars are already committed to the first 14-mile miles of light rail, and it would take many billions more to construct the full system.

Unfortunately even at this late date there is no solid analysis showing that light rail makes sense. The main failing is that there has never been a proper apples-to-apples alternatives analysis that compares the merits of light rail against an all-bus alternative based on bus rapid transit or BRT technology.

Therefore, even as the region increasingly commits to Sound Transit's multi-billion dollar rail strategy, neither public officials nor taxpayers know whether spending X billions on light rail would yield more benefit than spending the same amount on buses, or on other alternatives such as car and van pools, demand management, and so forth. The relevant data needed to make intelligent decisions simply does not exist.

The region is being led unwittingly into a light rail plan that will influence the quality of life in this region for decades and be the largest public works project in local history, without having done the same due-diligence homework that MBA schools teach businesses to use on far smaller investments. The public's trust in government to spend transportation dollars wisely is among the casualties.

This issue is highly relevant at present because Sound Transit is beginning to plan for a Phase 2 that would seek more federal and local money to expand Link's Initial Segment, and because it is still not too late to stop light rail and switch to a different strategy if new information—such as in this report—shows that would make more sense.

The initial stimulus for this report was the fact that Sound Transit's current light rail plan didn't reduce congestion and didn't seem cost-effective as an alternative to driving. Sound Transit's stubborn resistance to all criticism, its misrepresentations, and its failure to resubmit its much altered plan to a public vote of confidence—making all of us feel manipulated—have also been motivators. Perhaps most fundamental, was the knowledge that Sound Transit had abused the planning process by never having done a proper alternatives analysis. This greatly offended this planner's sense of what's right.

Link didn't just happen by accident; it emerged as the end result of a planning process. A key part of that process is the alternatives analysis.

Unfortunately, the alternatives analysis had been rigged to justify rail. In short, the process had been abused. Unfortunately that's not obvious to the casual reader of Sound Transit's 1993 FEIS and alternatives analysis report. It's an impressive and seeming well-written document. Most would assume it was competent and objective. Reluctantly the author came to conclude that the 1993 FEIS was essentially a sham. Something that appeared objective, but wasn't. Something intended more to sell, than to inform.

Part 1: Sound Transit has never done a proper alternatives analysis

In the transportation arena the alternatives analysis is critical. It's equivalent to a business case and is supposed to identify and evaluate the most promising alternatives available to solve a given transportation problem. It's about all that elected officials and voters have to rely on, if they wish to make rational decisions.

Sound Transit maintains that the region's one and only rail/bus alternatives analysis provides adequate rationale for selecting rail rather than express bus for the backbone of the region's transit system. However, for a wide variety of reasons this study -- documented in a 1993 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) prepared by Sound Transit's predecessor the RTA -- is inadequate and misleading. Nothing more up to date or more relevant has been done since, as Sound Transit recently made clear in its DSEIS for the Regional Transit Long-Range Plan.

The 1993 FEIS compared rail and bus technologies for the region's main transit corridors. Four alternatives were studied. One was the baseline or do nothing scenario called "No Build". Next was an extensive system of express buses operating on HOV lanes. This \$4.7 billion scenario was called "TSM". A second all-bus alternative -- called "Transitway/TSM" and costing \$5.5 billion-- was similar to TSM but used exclusive busways in lieu of HOV lanes. Finally, there was a hybrid rail/bus alternative called "Rail/TSM". This \$11.5 billion scenario called for 125-miles of rapid rail on a 100% grade separated right-of-way. It also included many of the TSM improvements, except those that would compete with rail.

There are two broad reasons why decisions about Link should not be based on this 1993 FEIS. First, the 1993 FEIS was neither adequate nor honest at the time it was completed. Second, what we are planning today is not what the 1993 alternatives analysis studied. In addition, circumstances have changed in the intervening 12 years.

A fundamental problem with the 1993 FEIS is that it compared alternatives that differed in both cost and benefit. In theory this can be dealt with by careful focus on cost-effectiveness, but RTA botched the job. Essentially, RTA concluded that an \$11.5 billion rail alternative would perform better than a \$4.7 billion bus alternative. This was simple-minded, and is essentially like comparing proposals to build a brick wall costing \$20,000 with a concrete wall costing \$10,000; then deciding bricks are a better technology since the \$20,000 wall would be higher than the \$10,000 wall.

The 1993 FEIS contained very little on cost effectiveness but what it did contain was presented in a biased fashion. Essentially, it masked the high cost of using rail as a means to increase transit ridership, and thus made the cost of the rail alternative appear more competitive with the bus alternative than it really was. Also it failed to show that the high marginal cost of rail riders was reasonable, or to put them in the context of costs in other cities or of other alternatives. In short, it didn't provide the kinds of information needed to make wise decisions. This topic is expanded in the explanation of Part 6 below.

Another serious shortcoming of the 1993 FEIS is that it didn't quantify or emphasize the impact of the alternatives on traffic congestion. This is critical because polls have repeatedly shown that the public's main transportation concern is reducing traffic congestion.

However, the main fault of the 1993 FEIS is that the bus alternatives were

deliberately designed to fail. In particular, the RTA unfairly alleged they lacked sufficient capacity through downtown Seattle and then did nothing to rectify the problem. The RTA used “inadequate capacity” as their primary reason for dismissing the bus alternatives, even though they were more cost-effective. This topic is further pursued in the summary of Part 5 below. The sum, the 1993 FEIS was neither adequate nor fair at the time it was completed.

The 1993 FEIS is even less a valid alternatives analysis for Link light rail.

The 1993 FEIS was an alternatives analysis for rapid rail not light rail. This fact was stated explicitly and repeatedly in the final report, and is not just a matter of semantics. Certainly there were similarities between the rapid rail in the 1993 FEIS and Link today in that the main rail corridors and station locations were similar and the train sizes were identical. However, the train speeds, capacities, rights-of-way, and network sizes were not the same. The maximum speed of the rapid rail in the 1993 FEIS was 70 mph, whereas Link’s maximum speed is 55 mph. Rapid rail had an average speed of 36 mph whereas Link’s would be 26 mph. The rapid rail system in the 1993 FEIS was asserted to have a maximum capacity of 22,000 persons per hour (pph) whereas Link’s maximum is 16,400. The ridership forecasts in the 1993 FEIS were based on a system that was 100% grade separated, whereas Link runs down the middle of the street in the Rainier valley and may have additional at-grade street crossings on the Eastside. These differences obviously affect ridership, reliability, and safety. In all these respects the Link system is different from, and inferior to, the rapid rail system studied in the 1993 FEIS.

In addition, the 1993 FEIS evaluated only one particular 125-mile long rapid rail network. This does not provide a comparison between the 14-mile system Sound Transit is presently constructing, or the 21-mile system approved by voters in 1996, versus BRT alternatives. Nor does it provide a comparison with any of the various networks that may emerge from Phase 2 planning: like Central Link extended to Everett and Tacoma but not to the eastside, or Central Link extended to the Eastside but not Everett and Tacoma, or to all those but not to Issaquah and Totem Lake. The 1993 FEIS did not even compare the ultimate light rail system envisioned by Sound Transit in their recent Draft Long-Range Plan. That Plan includes a curious, never before contemplated loop following the monorail from downtown Seattle to Ballard and then east to the University District. It also contains light rail along I-405 in spite of prior decisions that BRT be used in that corridor.

Since it’s not clear how much light rail it makes sense to build, how much is affordable, or how much voters would ever approve, it is not adequate that the only rail/bus alternatives analysis this region has to rely on studied just one particular 125-mile long configuration. In fact, rational decision-making requires that a range of possible light rail networks –any of which might represent the optimum or final configuration—be compared against BRT alternatives.

An important circumstance that has changed dramatically since the 1993 FEIS is the assumed cost of constructing light rail. In the material handed to voters at the time of the 1996 ballot Sound Transit said: “Sound Move is based on extremely conservative cost and ridership assumptions and methodologies reviewed by an independent expert review panel appointed by the governor, the state Legislature and the state Transportation Department.” However, this became front-page scandal in 2000 when Sound Transit was forced to admit this was all-wrong, and had to increase the project budget by over one billion

dollars, or roughly 44%. For this reason any rail cost assumptions made prior to 2000 were probably grossly underestimated. This fact alone makes the 1993 FEIS, as it stands, obsolete and misleading.

Still another reason the 1993 FEIS is obsolete is that over half the HOV network --whose costs were included in the TSM or bus alternative—has since been completed. Those are sunk costs. Thus the all-bus alternative is now less expensive than it was in 1993.

The net effect of the underestimated rail costs and partial completion of the HOV network is to make the cost difference between the rail and all-bus alternatives even greater today than it appeared to be in 1993. To be even roughly relevant today, the 1993 FEIS cost estimates would need to be updated. They haven't been. In fact Sound Transit hasn't even published an updated cost estimate for the 21-mile system approved by the voters in 1996.

Sound Transit's recent release of a Draft SEIS states quite clearly that its Long-Range Plan is based on the 1993 FEIS. However, since the 1993 FEIS was not a valid exercise in the first place, and is now obsolete, the entire foundation for Sound Transit's Long-Range Plan --not to mention the part already under construction-- is faulty. The FTA should recognize this and force Sound Transit to conduct the proper alternatives analysis that is long overdue and which is recommended so often throughout this report.

Part 2: Sound Transit morphed rapid rail into light rail

Sound Transit has not wanted to do an alternatives analysis for Link, so they have maintained that the 1993 FEIS for rapid rail was really about light rail. In one recent presentation the agency falsely states that the 1993 FEIS compared light rail and BRT. In fact the 1993 FEIS never mentioned BRT, but it did address light rail (LRT) in a cursory fashion along with monorail and other alternatives the RTA wasn't interested in. This is what the FEIS said about light rail.

"Surface LRT options were analyzed to the point that it became clear that these options did not adequately serve the goals and objectives of the Regional Transit Project. Because of the superior performance of the grade-separated RTP system in terms of consistency with land-use objectives, level of service, and ridership, it was recommended as the rail technology in the recommended draft Systems Plan." (Ref 1: page 2-61)


In spite of their one and only alternatives analysis having recommended against it, Sound Transit plans to put some "surface LRT" into the very backbone of the light rail system they are building. How then is it possible for Sound Transit to claim that the 1993 FEIS supports their decision to make light rail the technology of choice?

Part 3: The shortcomings of Link Light Rail

Light rail has many appeals to the superficial observer. It promises fast effortless trips bypassing congestion. Many hope it will lure others off the road thus leaving more room for them. Some believe it's a way to control sprawl, clean the air and reduce energy consumption. As visitors we've all benefited from riding rail systems in other cities. Civic boosters think Seattle can't be world class without rail. Unfortunately, at least in the Puget Sound setting, light rail is one of those things where the less you know about it; the better you probably like it.

Link's fundamental problem is that it costs too much and does too little.

Polls consistently show that traffic congestion is one of the public's highest concerns. Link was sold to voters by implying it was a solution to traffic congestion. Yet Sound Transit's own studies prove Link would have almost no effect. The FEIS for the 21-mile Central Link shows that the \$2.6 billion (in 95\$) system would only reduce road traffic about 1/3 of one percent. This is equivalent to taking two and a half cars off a lane on 520 that is packed bumper to bumper with cars from Montlake to the east shore of Lake Washington. It's hardly noticeable, as the bar chart below illustrates.




The \$1.5 billion (95\$) Initial Segment now under construction would

accomplish even less. It would only reduce traffic 1/10th of one percent.

Even auto traffic into the Seattle CBD is minimally impacted.

It turns out the miniscule traffic reduction effects of Link's 14-mile Initial Segment would be wiped out within 45 days of its opening by the normal growth trend in regional traffic as the following chart shows. The 21-mile Central Link has greater ridership, but its traffic reduction effect would be wiped out in less than a year.



Sound Transit has repeatedly implied that Link would reduce traffic congestion even while knowing it wouldn't. This was done with pictures, innuendo, and carefully chosen wording so there was never any direct statement that could be challenged legally. It was done extensively during Sound Transits pre-vote marketing campaign and continues today. The statements that Link will not reduce traffic congestion are brief and don't stand out in the EIS's, which very few voters read anyway. Sound Transit never acknowledged publicly that light rail wouldn't reduce congestion until, in December 2000, the author used Sound Transit's own data to publicize that knowledge in a Seattle Times OP ED.

Unfortunately Sound Transit's admission came years after the 1996 vote.


Light rail: There will never be a better time Richard Harkness got one thing right in a guest column (The Times, Dec 22): Light rail will not ease traffic congestion. Yes, that's a fact. (Dave Earling, OpEd, Seattle Times, Dec 26, 2000)

The effects light rail could have on environmental issues like air pollution or energy use are proportional to its impact on traffic, and thus similarly miniscule.

As a way to get cars off the road Link is notably costly. If that's the primary aim of the project then it's fair to divide the project's cost by the number of cars it removes to get a sanity check on Link's cost-effectiveness. The result is that it would cost taxpayers \$100,000 per year for each car which Link IS removes from peak period traffic. This cost would continue every year until the bonds were paid off in about 30 years.

The chart below shows how much this particular cost metric increased from the time voters approved Link. The left bar is based on Central Link costs at the time of the vote. The center bar is based on Central Link costs after Sound Transit admitted having underestimated them and raised Link's cost by \$1 billion in Jan 2001. The right bar is based on Link IS costs as reported in the Feb. 2002 Environmental Assessment.

Annual cost per vehicle removed from peak period traffic



In stark contrast, a recent Seattle Times article reported on a company that had significantly increased car pool use by giving employees just \$75 a month per person to carpool. And, for \$100,000 per year, it may be cheaper to simply pay people to quit their day jobs and stay home.

Once the congestion reduction myth was publicly debunked, rail advocates—such as King County Executive and Sound Transit Board Member Ron Sims—switched to claiming that light rail offers an alternative to driving. They said it provides “choice”. Indeed it does offer choice to a favored few, but again that

gift costs society roughly \$80,000 per year for each individual who –according to Sound Transit’s ridership estimates for 2020-- would find Link IS attractive enough to stop using a car. In this case the cost of choice is huge. To paraphrase Winston Churchill: Never in the region’s history will so many, have paid so much, to benefit so few.

Link light rail has other deficiencies beside cost-ineffectiveness. It is highly inequitable in that it provides service to a relatively narrow corridor while the cost is borne across a wide region. Capacity on the south line –due to the decision to run on the surface along Rainier Avenue—is only one third the capacity of the north line, and thus forever shortchanges the entire south Puget Sound area.

The Initial Segment serves only one of the region’s 21 designated urban growth centers. Even a full 100+ mile light rail system -- which is not guaranteed and which the region may never be able to afford-- would bypass many important commercial and employment centers such as South center, Renton, Bothell, Tukwila, West Seattle, south Lake Union, Bell town, Seattle Center, Ballard, Magnolia, south Seattle below the stadiums, West Seattle, key Boeing sites, the Sammamish plateau office park, the emerging biotech area on Elliott Bay, and so forth.

Link’s central control system and extensive tunneling make it vulnerable to power outages and terrorism.

If Link is not extended into a full regional system its preemption of the Downtown Seattle Transit Tunnel would compromise the remaining express bus system and dim prospects for a regional BRT system.

Some of the region’s most precious resources are its preexisting rights-of-way (ROW), and those should be used efficiently. Having the center lanes on I-90 devoted solely to the occasional light rail train is not a good use of ROW since it would reduce the total people moving capacity of the bridge relative to having a mixture of BRT buses, car and vanpools, emergency vehicles, etc. use those lanes. Adding light rail would actually reduce capacity in this corridor.

Currently over ten times more daily trips are made by car pool than by mass transit in this region. (283,000 by transit, versus 3,554,000 by car/van pool) Arguably it is far more important to maintain and expand car/van pooling than to expand an already excellent mass transit system. Displaced them into less protected lanes than they have today is not progress.

In short, upon close inspection of the facts, Link light rail doesn’t seem to be a good idea, or to be worth the money. This would be true even if there were no obvious alternatives.

In economic terms, one must examine the “opportunity costs” of going with light rail when there appear to be less costly ways to achieve much the same benefit. What else could the region do with the money that could be saved? Alternately, if taxpayers are willing to spend the same amount, how much further might we get toward reducing congestion and improving the environment if some more cost effective technology were employed? What if we could have 200 route miles of BRT for what – according to the GAO study-- 14 miles of light rail is costing? What if some of the light rail money could be diverted to accelerate the Alaska Way viaduct and 520 bridge replacements?

Part 4— BRT and Other Alternatives to Light Rail

If the objective is to reduce congestion or travel delay, the author has identified about 50 alternatives to light rail. They include things like widening roads, increasing car and vanpool usage, telecommuting, and clearing accidents and breakdowns faster. However, if only various forms of mass transit are of interest, then bus rapid transit or BRT is the most likely contender to light rail. If light rail is “Plan A”, then BRT is “Plan B”.


BRT is actually a systems solution comprised of several elements. The core would be express buses operating on HOV lanes, essentially what we have today, but more and better. Dedicated busways are possible but probably not necessary. Service frequencies would match that of rail. A BRT alternative would also involve bus priority lanes on certain arterials, bus priority signalization, off-bus fare collection, direct access ramps, and a range of other things all intended to make bus travel more rapid and attractive.

BRT hasn’t gotten much publicity here in Puget Sound. However, BRT has been implemented elsewhere, particularly overseas, with great success. The U.S. General Accounting Office published a report comparing it to light rail and encouraging cities planning light rail to give BRT serious consideration as a less expensive alternative. It’s proven technology and the advent of hybrid buses makes it even more attractive.

There is no question that BRT has enough capacity to handle the regions mass transit needs. As shown in the chart below, BRT routes operating in other countries already carry far more people than Link could carry, or that Sound Transit estimates Link would need to carry.

Figure 5.12a

Capacity: BRT vs Link north



In terms of ability to meet future needs it is worthwhile to note that there is no way to increase the capacity of Link light rail since train lengths would be limited by stations already in place and headways can't be reduced. For these reasons even a second rail tunnel through downtown in some distant year wouldn't help. In other words the limits on rail system capacity are systemic and not subject to local remedies. In contrast bus capacity can be increased by building short parallel paths around local bottlenecks, and then only when needed.

Based on ST's 1993 FEIS the highest volume that a BRT system would need to carry by 2020 is 12,000 persons per hour between downtown Seattle and the U District. This volume could be handled by about 110 articulated buses per hour. This volume of buses would use about 10% of the capacity of a single express lane along that stretch. Elsewhere BRT would need much less than 10% of the capacity of an HOV lane.


BRT should also be faster. BRT buses can operate in express non-stop mode once loaded whereas light rail must stop at every station.

BRT would probably require fewer transfers. Buses can circulate in neighborhoods picking up passenger before entering the HOV lanes for non-stop travel to major destinations.

Still, the most compelling reason for BRT is that much of the "guideway" needed for BRT already exists in the form of the region's 200 miles of HOV lanes. And every investment made in expanding or improving these guideways for BRT has the double benefit of encouraging more car and vanpooling.

Car and Van pooling—This report focuses on BRT versus light rail. However, car/van pooling is probably even more cost effective than BRT, and should be among the alternatives considered most carefully as the region charts its transportation strategy. There are currently about 250,000 people car or van pooling to work. Car and vanpools are already far more effective in getting people out of single occupancy vehicles than is mass transit, as the following chart based on PSRC data makes clear.

Mode Share for Trips in Puget Sound Region in 1998



If the number of people car or van pooling to work could be increased by just 5% it would take the same number of cars off the road as would building the 21-mile Central Link light rail system.

At last estimate Central Link would cost \$2.6 billion in 02\$. Simple calculations show it would cost \$43,000 per year to take a car off the road using Central Link. Many people who don't car pool today could probably be induced to do so for considerably less than \$43,000 per year. If so, car and van pooling would be a far more cost-effective way to relieve traffic congestion than building Link light rail.

Part 5—The capacity issue

Part 5 investigates the capacity issue in depth because back in 1993 the RTP alleged that buses had insufficient capacity to meet the regions needs and dismissed bus alternatives largely for that reason. Ever since, buses or BRT have remained off the table as far as the core portion of the regional transit network is concerned.

RTP's treatment of the capacity issue in the 1993 FEIS appears to have been deliberately manipulated to favor rail. Basically, RTP postulated an all-bus alternative called TSM and compared it against a hybrid rail/bus alternative called Rail/TSM. During their evaluation RTP estimated year 2020 ridership

for both alternatives and concluded that the Downtown Seattle Transit Tunnel (DSTT) could not handle the number of riders the bus alternative would attract. RTP's response was to reduce the predicted ridership of 518,000 daily riders to what they said the tunnel could handle, namely 474,000. This significantly degraded the cost-effectiveness of the bus alternative as well as reduced other ridership dependent benefits, such as impacts on air pollution.

What the RTP did not do—after recognizing that a capacity problem might exist—was to verify the assumptions they had made about tunnel capacity and/or seek ways to modify the bus alternative so as to eliminate the alleged capacity problem. In short, RTP put a knowingly and deliberately hobbled bus alternative into competition with the rail alternative.

The key assumption that RTP did not verify concerned tunnel capacity. There had been six prior paper studies that each reached different conclusions, ranging from 125 to 192 buses per hour in each direction. The RTP chose to assume 100, a value based on operating buses inefficiently. About 135 buses per hour were needed to carry the predicted demand. Why -- when capacity was so critical -- didn't RTP assume the tunnel would be managed efficiently? Why -- with the whole multi-billion dollar rail vs. bus decision hanging in the balance -- didn't RTP take the trouble to verify the tunnels true capacity with real world trials? This could not have been oversight or incompetence, it must have been deliberate.

If the RTP had properly verified tunnel capacity and still found it below 135 buses per hour they could, and should, have found other remedies so capacity problems in this 1.5-mile segment of a 125-mile network didn't become the tail that wagged the dog.

In prior studies, a range of fixes had been identified. They ranged from increasing bus capacity on downtown streets to building a second parallel bus tunnel, which RTP staff had estimated would cost \$600 million. As a worst case, RTP could have added this second tunnel to the bus alternative thus completely eliminating the downtown bus capacity problem. Failure to do so was apparent bias or manipulation. It seems especially egregious since the RTP elected to provide 20 miles of tunnel for the \$11.5 billion rail alternative yet was unwilling to provide even a mile or two for the \$4.7 billion bus alternative.

In short, had RTA resolved the alleged bus capacity constraint—either by finding it didn't exist, or fixing it-- the RTA could not have claimed the bus alternative was unable to handle its predicted ridership, and—able to carry its full ridership-- the TSM alternative would have been much more competitive in its comparison against rapid rail.

Part 5 also addresses ridership forecasts that appear to conflict. In 1993 RTP estimated that by 2020 the peak load on the rail system would be 15,000 persons per hour at the peak load point just north of the DSTT. Sound Transit still asserts the long term demand for rail transit would create a peak load point demand of 15,000 persons per hour on the north line, and that we need a system able to handle it. However, the much more recent forecast for Central Link predicts a peak load of only 5415 persons per hour. This discrepancy is something the large difference between the 125 and 21-mile systems does not appear to explain.

This is an important issue in that if 15,000 is the correct number it appears that

Link would run out of capacity soon after 2020 and is therefore not a long range solution for the region's capacity needs. Indeed one of the reasons RTA gave for choosing rapid rail in 1993 was that its assumed capacity of 22,000 gave it headroom for growth well beyond 2020. In addition, if 15,000 is correct, Link may not be enough capacity on its south line to even meet demand in 2020.

On the other hand if 5415 is correct, it is possible that system ridership is simply lower than originally thought.

It seems that no matter which forecast is correct, Sound Transit faces an embarrassing situation. If the higher forecast is correct, light rail is inadequate. If the lower forecast is correct, it completely destroys Sound Transit's claim that buses lack sufficient capacity through downtown, even if the tunnel could only handle 100 buses per hour.

Sound Transit's claim that light rail "would provide the same people moving capacity as a 12 lane highway" is simply false. Just one freeway lane pair full of buses could carry far more people than Link. Rather than compare what these systems could carry, it is more meaningful to compare what highways actually carry on a daily basis versus what light rail is actually expected to carry. Sound Transit's ridership forecasts for Central Link—at the ship canal where it is heavily loaded-- show it would carry only slightly more people in 2020 than a single lane pair on I-5 carries today. Along the bulk of its route Central Link would carry only a fraction of what one lane pair on I-5 is now carrying.

Part 6: The cost issue

Part 6 has two broad objectives. One is to demonstrate how the 1993 FEIS was inadequate and biased in the way it addressed cost-effectiveness. The second objective is to use the raw data in the 1993 FEIS and related documents to produce an estimate of what Sound Transit's current rail-centric strategy might end up costing this region in relation to the all-bus alternative they rejected.

The 1993 FEIS gave very little attention to either cost or cost-effectiveness. Almost everything that large report had to say was contained in a single small table listing cost and ridership totals for each of the four alternatives. (Table 4 in the 1993 FEIS)

Table 4. Summary of System Alternatives Characteristics.


Alternative	Capital Cost (billions of 1991 \$)	Operating and Maintenance Cost (millions of 1991 \$)	Daily Ridership (Year 2020)	Annual Ridership (year 2020) (millions)	Cost per Rider (1991 \$)	Cost per New Rider (1991 \$)
No-Build	\$1.2	\$274	388,500	109.4	3.67	N.A.
TSM	\$4.7	\$399	473,900	133.7	5.92	N.A.
Transitway/ TSM	\$5.5	\$406	480,000	135.4	6.36	11.39
Rail/TSM (includes Commuter Rail)	\$11.5	\$492	560,500	157.3	7.94	12.52

This form of presentation was deceptive. The difference between the rail and bus alternatives, shows in the numbers, but it doesn't appear dramatic. This author, probably like many others, saw that table and felt that while the bus alternative was more cost effective, it was not dramatically so. This was

because the cost per rider figures RTP chose to present were averaged across all riders and thus did not allow the cost-effectiveness of the rapid rail element to be separated out and examined for reasonableness. It could be claimed this information was deliberately hidden.

To better illustrate what could have been done, and what should have been done, the data in that FEIS Table 4 has been reformatted into Figure 6.1 below. Remember, this is the picture as it would have appeared in 1993, with all costs in 91\$ and before the rail cost estimates were found to have been underestimated.

This chart conveys a very different message. Not only would it cost much more than we are paying today to increase transit ridership by implementing TSM, but it would cost dramatically more still for those additional riders that rapid rail could add above and beyond what TSM could attract on its own.



As to the detail, transit would attract 389,000 daily riders by 2020 if we did nothing but grow the existing bus system. RTP called this the “No Build” alternative. The chart shows that society is now paying about \$3.30 for each one-way bus ride, less the 80 or so cents recovered at the fare box. (The transit industry calls a one-way ride a “rider”.) Next, it shows that implementing just the TSM alternative would increase daily transit ridership by about 80,000, and that these extra 80,000 rides would cost society about \$15.50 each. Finally, it shows that if we build the 125-mile rapid rail system it would attract an additional 85,000 riders above and beyond what the all-bus TSM alternative could achieve. However, these extra rides would cost \$25 each.

If the RTA had elected to fix the alleged capacity bottleneck by building a second bus tunnel this cost picture would have changed to that shown in Figure 6.2c.





Figure 6.2c emphasizes the point that society would need to spend far more to attract these new riders than it has been willing to spend in the past. The upsweep of the bars illustrates very dramatically the law of diminishing returns. Once those with relatively little choice have gotten aboard, it becomes increasingly expensive to improve transit service enough to attract others. This raises the questions of affordability and reasonableness. There is some point where the cost of making transit more attractive so it will attract more riders begins to exceed the benefits. To make rail worthwhile the benefits of each rider it adds would need to exceed \$47.50 per one-way ride. Again, that is what would have been visible in 1993. After accounting for ST's underestimated rail costs, and inflating to current dollars, that \$47.50 becomes \$93. The 1993 FEIS did not get into any of this, perhaps because they felt it would have worked against their desire to promote rail.

Figure 6.2a is another chart --based on Table 4 in the FEIS -- that would have been helpful.



The cost (\$960 million/yr) and ridership (172,000/day) of the Rail/TSM alternative is represented by the dot at the end of the Rail/TSM line. The same is true of the TSM line. This chart shows that while the Rail/TSM alternative costs more and does more, the TSM alternative is actually more cost effective since its “trend line” is not as steep.


NOTE: If the RTA’s goal had been to increase ridership by just 85,000 above the NoBuild baseline, rather than 172,000, this chart shows that the original TSM alternative would have had adequate capacity, as well as being less expensive. Alternately if the goal had been to reach 300,000 riders the rapid rail alternative itself would have failed for lack of capacity. Thus, where the goal is set can sometimes determine which alternative wins. Planners can manipulate this to get the answer they want. In the case of the 1993 FEIS the goal was set high enough to (allegedly) break the bus alternative but not high enough to break the rail alternative. This is one reason Part 8 calls for a range of different size rail networks to be compared with bus alternatives.

Presenting the data with a chart like Figure 6.2a is useful because it graphically suggests the following: Why not just intensify or extend the TSM alternative until it achieves the same ridership as rail, because it looks as though the savings would be worthwhile? In other words, whatever we were doing in the

TSM alternative, just do more of the same. In practice this would have meant more frequent bus service, more routes, and perhaps more HOV lanes, direct access ramps, and park & ride lots. The arrows suggest this idea. RTP staff was aware of this option and had already estimated its cost.

However, the TSM alternative can't be extended until the alleged bus capacity constraint in downtown Seattle is dealt with. Maybe the RTA's assumption about tunnel capacity was wrong and there really isn't any bottleneck. However, to be conservative the author assumed that the bottleneck was real, and that it takes the most costly of the available remedies—namely a second bus tunnel—to fix it. This was an option that RTA staffers had already identified and estimated would cost \$600 million. The RTA had also estimated the cost of extending TSM services so as to achieve greater ridership. In short the RTA had shown how the TSM alternative could be extended to achieve more ridership, and they had estimated the costs of doing so. However, all this information was hidden in backup technical reports and none of it was used to fix the bus alternative's alleged capacity problem. Instead the 1993 FEIS presented a hobbled bus alternative unable to match rail ridership or achieve its other benefits.

The chart below shows what would have happened if the RTP had un-hobbled the bus alternative. The first part of the TSM trend line shows the result of including \$600 million for a second tunnel, which allows TSM to achieve the "unconstrained" ridership forecast by the RTP. The second part of the line is based on RTP's cost estimate for extending it so as to attract and handle as many riders as the Rail/TSM alternative.



At this point it is apparent that fixing the alleged TSM capacity constraint and extending TSM is a good idea. It would save taxpayers about \$400 million (in \$91\$) per year. The RTP could have done this analysis and included it in the 1993 FEIS. Was their failure to do so a matter of incompetence, or of deliberate bias? Again, this is the picture that RTP should have presented in 1993. But what does it mean for Link light rail today?

The above analysis can be updated and used to show the implications of proceeding with Sound Transit's light rail-centric strategy, which calls for building as much as 125 miles of light rail along with supporting TSM elements such as bus feeders, HOV improvements, and park and ride lots. In other words the RTP created and evaluated a "Rapid Rail/TSM" alternative with 125 miles of rapid rail. What the author does in this report is create a "Light Rail/TSM" alternative with 125 miles of light rail, and then compare it against an all-bus or TSM alternative using BRT.




Figure 6.4 shows the result.

It now appears that Sound Transit never intends to make this comparison, but it's essential information because the region's at a fork in the road. It can either proceed to implement Sound Transit's light rail-centric strategy, working out along the line in Figure 6.4 to build as much light rail as possible. Or it can switch to an equally effective all-bus or BRT strategy while there's still time. The public needs to understand the dramatic difference in cost.

Thus Figure 6.4 compares the cost of Sound Transit's light rail-centric strategy with the cost of an all-bus or BRT alternative able to reduce regional Vehicle Miles of Travel or VMT by the same amount. (Reduction in VMT is a better metric for comparing benefit or effectiveness of the alternatives than is transit ridership. Travel delay would have been a better metric yet, but the RTP did not provide that data.)

Figure 6.4 is based on conservative assumptions. For instance the author assumed that a 125-mile light rail system would attract the same ridership as the 125-mile rapid rail system studied by RTP. Actually, light rail would probably attract fewer riders since it's slower. On the cost side, Figure 6.4 is based on light rail costing an average of \$120 million/mile whereas Link IS is actually

costing \$138 million/mile and Central Link is expected to cost \$158 million/mile. (All these are in 02\$) Also, it was assumed that the all-bus alternative would require a second bus tunnel costing \$600 million (91\$) through downtown Seattle, although the existing bus tunnel may well suffice, and if not there are probably less expensive remedies than a second tunnel. In other words, the Rail/TSM line in Figure 6.4 is probably steeper than shown, the TSM line is probably flatter, and the difference between them is probably greater than \$900 million/yr.


As to details, the RTP originally estimated the 125-mile rapid rail system would cost \$7.9 billion in 91\$. The construction bids Sound Transit received a few years ago showed that actual costs were 44% higher than originally estimated. Figure 6.4 assumes the 125-mile light rail system would cost 1.44 times that \$7.9 billion, or \$11.4 billion in 91\$. In 02\$ the 125-mile light rail system would cost \$15 billion. (This is probably the best estimate publicly available today for what the light rail system in ST's Long-Range Plan might cost) The original TSM costs were updated in two ways. The cost component allocated for building HOV lanes was cut in half since half the HOV network has now been completed. Second, \$600 million was added for the second bus tunnel. All capital costs were annualized by assuming a 30-year, 6% bond. Annual O&M costs from the RTP table were included without modification. Finally, cost totals were inflated from 91\$ to 02\$ to make them more timely.

The dots at the end of the Rail/TSM and TSM lines show the annual cost of these two alternatives. For instance it would cost about \$1.5 billion per year to fully implement Sound Transits light rail-centric strategy by building 125 miles of light rail. The lines from the origin to the dots give some rough indication of the costs of smaller systems. For instance, a system with 63 miles of light rail rather than 125 might cost about \$750 million per year. By the same token a BRT system able to achieve the same VMT reduction might cost about \$300 million per year. The actual cost and performance of Link IS and Central Link are shown for reference.

Figure 6.4 is probably the most important chart in the entire report. What does it tell us? It shows that to achieve the same level of transit ridership estimated for a 125-mile rail system, switching from light rail to an all bus strategy would save taxpayers about \$900 million per year. This would continue over the 30-years life of the bonds.

The huge cost difference between Link light rail and BRT simply reflects the fact that the best technology for one region is not necessary the best for another. Light rail doesn't have an easy fit in this region because we lack the abandoned railroad rights-of-way or flat terrain that makes constructing light rail relatively easy in other cities. On the other hand our excellent bus system and extensive HOV network makes BRT particularly attractive.

The diagram below attempts to clarify any remaining confusion as to how the RTA concluded buses were unsuitable while the author reached the opposite conclusion.



The flowchart reads as follows. The RTP started by designing an all-bus alternative called TSM and a 125-mile rapid rail plus feeder bus alternative called Rail/TSM. Consultants then estimated the cost and ridership for each alternative. At that point it became apparent that predicted bus ridership would exceed RTP's assumption for tunnel capacity. RTP elected not to fix the capacity problem using any of the remedies that staff had previously identified.

This resulted in a crippled bus alternative being compared against the rail alternative, and thence to RTP's conclusion that buses couldn't meet the regions needs, whereas rapid rail could.

In this report the author starts with RTP's bus and rail system designs, and with RTP's cost and ridership forecasts, but reaches a different conclusion. He did that by adding a second bus tunnel to "fix" the alleged bus capacity bottleneck downtown, then adding more bus service so it would attract the same ridership as the rail alternative. The cost of these modifications was added in. He then concluded that the modified bus alternative could equal rail in ridership, have sufficient capacity for long-term growth, and be much less expensive.

Part 7: Evaluation and recommendations

Part 7 tries to explain why things have gone astray, and some of the broader implications that Sound Transit's preoccupation with light rail is having on public trust and on competing uses for scarce tax dollars. This report presents new information that will hopefully trigger action. Part 7 recommends several specific actions that seem appropriate based on this new information.

Why things went wrong- There is a huge disconnect between the problem (traffic congestion) and the proposed solution (light rail).

This disconnect shows that what drives officials and decisions in this arena was not an honest attempt to find congestion remedies based on solid analysis. Instead, what has happened is best explained by some complex mixture of myth, fact, wishful thinking, uninformed opinion, altruistic and not so altruistic motives, hard-ball politics, ego, psychology, bureaucratic maneuvering, and most of all, money. When all this enters the mix it is not surprising that actually spending taxpayer money wisely so as to make the most progress

against traffic congestion fell by the wayside.

As to motives, one must acknowledge the superficial appeal of rail transit. Emotionally rail seems like a simple “silver bullet” solution for a complex and intractable problem. Promoting it appears to be “doing something”.

But elected officials have another set of reasons to favor rail. They revolve around power and money. If it proceeds, Link light rail will be among the largest public works projects in Puget Sound history. Billions of dollars will be spent. Officials can feel important making decisions about how billions are spent. They can proudly leave a legacy of concrete and steel. They can please certain powerful parties on the receiving end of those billions. They can be seen as providing jobs and stimulating the economy. Perhaps most of all they can be seen as bringing in “free” money from Washington D.C. Fundamentally Link is a “pork barrel” project.

In terms of who pays and who benefits, Link is a clever way to transfer money from the pockets of many to the pockets of a few. Not enough is taken from the pockets of the average taxpayer (in the form of sales tax and auto registration tax) to cause him or her to ‘fight city hall’. On the other hand the relative few directly benefiting from Links design, financing, and construction maintain a behind-the-scenes pressure to keep Link going.

Another reason Sound Transit’s a clever mechanism for wealth transfer is that taxpayers have practically no way to stop it. The State Legislature created Sound Transit, but forgot to make Sound Transit’s Board members directly elected, and they forgot to give voters in the Sound Transit taxing district any practical control over Sound Transit via initiative. As a result the only way local voters can control Sound Transit is by mounting a costly statewide initiative. This self-confidence in its own untouchability gave Sound Transit’s attorney the hubris to say in open court that Sound Transit recognized no limits on how much it could spend or how long it could take building light rail.

Key officials have long wanted a rail transit system in Puget Sound, period. In the early 1990’s consultants were hired to prepare the necessary paperwork in order to get federal funding and meet state law. Although alternatives analyses are supposed to be objective studies, consultants are generally fairly astute at figuring out what the client really wants, and repeat business means delivering it. The client wanted rail. As a result the 1993 FEIS or alternatives analysis became a pro forma exercise meant to justify this preordained conclusion.

In short, the 1993 FEIS is a sham; a document meant to satisfy legal requirements, but almost totally useless in providing objective information that would help officials or the public make a wise decisions about spending billions of dollars.

The FTA colludes with Sound Transit in these abuses of the planning process. FTA overlooks faulty work such as the 1993 FEIS, and their requirements for funding projects like Link appear lax. FTA is probably among those Federal agencies that have been accused of being in bed with the organizations they are supposed to regulate.

It is also clear that Sound Transit’s board has little concern for spending tax dollars efficiently. In other words achieving the “most bang for the taxpayer buck” is not a high priority with that group. If the Sound Transit Board really wanted cost effective solutions they would have scrutinized the 1993 FEIS in

the way the author has done and probably chosen BRT, since it appears BRT would save billions. After finding that Link's costs had been underestimated and needed to be increased by 44%, they would certainly have revisited their choice of rail, rather than simply looked for additional money. They would have published and agonized over, rather than hidden, the high cost-per-rider data for Sounder and Link. They would have calculated the approximate cost of fully implementing their current rail centric strategy and compared that against BRT. These are the minimum things a board really concerned with spending tax dollars wisely would have done.

The Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC) must also take considerable blame. If that organization were sincerely concerned with getting the most bang for the taxpayer buck it would have eagerly embraced and practiced Least Cost Planning—as State Law requires-- rather than trying so hard to avoid it. It would have analyzed Sound Transit's light rail plans and ensured they were cost effective relative to other alternatives rather than simply downloading them intact into the Metropolitan Transportation Plan (MTP). It would consider van and car-pooling as a major stand-alone alternative to investing billions in mass transit and highways, rather than just as window dressing attached to the main transit and highway alternatives.

In fact, it is not exaggerating to state that if the PSRC had obeyed the law as regards Least Cost Planning (LCP), Sound Transit' light rail plan would probably never gotten this far.

The importance of trust-- It has become increasingly clear that voters don't trust Sound Transit and Sound Transit doesn't trust voters. In fact, Sound Transit has become the poster child for why voters distrust government to spend their transportation tax dollars wisely. There are good reasons for this mistrust.

Voters overwhelmingly voted to rescind Sound Transit's tax on vehicle registration, but ST still fights to overturn that expression of public will in the courts. ST changes the project greatly from what voters approved in 1996 but vigorously fights a lawsuit that would have put the much altered plan back on the ballot for a vote of confidence.

Sound Transit wants more money. However, while claiming it has a public mandate and support for light rail, ST is deathly afraid to ask voters to increase the existing light rail tax. Thus ST supporters used political strong-arm tactics to force light rail into a broad package of regional transportation projects where voters couldn't reject it without rejecting everything else as well.

On this November's advisory ballot voters were asked if they supported that package, which the ballot explicitly said was intended to reduce congestion and improve safety. Since Sound Transit had already admitted Link wouldn't reduce congestion, putting it into that package was a remarkable example of cynical manipulation and deception.

The problem is magnified since that ballot—which still implies Link would help reduce congestion-- was seen by millions, while few have seen the truth.

When one party has the funds to broadcast misleading statements through a megaphone while their critics have only the occasional Op-Ed or letter to the editor to whisper a rebuttal, there is simply no way the public will get a balanced story. Critics, such as CETA, have found the facts don't matter when there's no money to get them disseminated. This has been a fundamental

structural problem throughout the entire light rail debate here in Puget Sound.

The role that trust, or lack thereof, plays in reaching any solution for Puget Sound's transportation problems is hard to overstate. Part 7 contains a long list of newspaper quotes like the following:

Sound Transit: a matter of trust *The 10-year plan for increasing transportation system capacity in the Central Puget Sound area was dubbed "Sound Move" by its creators at the regional transportation authority, Sound Transit. ...*

....Half of those ten years are now past, and the Sound Move plan has fallen well short of its billing. The most visible culprit of course is the light rail project, which is \$1 billion over budget, three years behind schedule and the subject of a federal audit.

...It's the sort of indecision that makes one wonder, despite the agency's official denial, just how much of the 10-year plan was completed in a vacuum, without input from the very people it is meant to serve. It's the kind of day to day waffling and mismanagement that wastes time, overruns budgets and over time, causes people to lose trust. Some of us in the Legislature have noticed the loss of trust in Sound Transit.

... Why should taxpayers support long term financial commitment to transportation when Sound Transit provides such a convenient example of a commitment gone sour?

...The second offers revote on the grounds that the Sound Transit board's actions have significantly altered the proposition citizens approve in 1996.

...Because of Sound Transit's lackluster performance so far, any taxes directed toward transit and transportation projects from here on out need to be the best spent money in state government.

....At the heart of the public trust, President Abraham Lincoln once wrote, is trusting the public. Government should not be – and cannot afford to be – afraid of letting the people judge how well their money is being spent. Let's Vote. (Op Ed by 15 members of the State Legislature, Seattle Times, Feb. 20, 2001)

Requests that Sound Transit consider alternatives- There have been numerous requests that Sound Transit reconsider its light rail plans. Again this story is told via articles quoted from local newspapers. Two examples are:

Sound Transit Board: It's time to do your job *After the overwhelmingly negative wave of recent events, you would think a board that calls itself "Sound" would stop shelling out our money to move forward on such a monumental undertaking as a \$4.2 billion light rail plan. You would think they would call a timeout not just to patch up the holes that have been revealed, but a timeout to actually rethink whether this flawed vessel, light rail, is going to get us to the vital goal of reducing traffic congestion in central Puget Sound. Yet in response to the damaging report issued last week by the US Inspector General's office... all we get here at home is more patch-up.*

... My response is this: Is there any event or combination of facts, any

misgivings about cost, funding, ridership, or concerns over the Inspector General's criticisms, anything at all that would finally cause the Sound Transit Board to ask, "Is proceeding with light rail still a good idea?" It seems no issue exists that's significant enough to prompt the board's serious review of alternative solutions.

...The board's irresponsibility is found in the decision to remain silent despite their growing awareness of that misinformation, including possession of significant evidence that light rail may not be a cost-effective transit alternative.

Civic groups, critics and other elected officials are calling ever more loudly for a complete review of the project including available alternatives... (Booth Gardner, former Governor Washington State, Op Ed Seattle Times, April 11, 2001)

Full speed ahead for light rail *In a hasty attempt to secure \$500 million in federal funding before the Clinton administration steps down, Sound Transit will move forward with light rail despite mounting objections about costs, the agency's leaders say.*

...But Sound Transit Executive Director Bob White and board Chairman Dave Earling say they already know what the board will decide on that pivotal day: The agency will not explore alternatives to light rail... (Chris McGann, Seattle P-I, Jan. 5, 2001)

Recommendations-- This report recommends the following actions:

- 1) The FTA should reject the DSEIS for Sound Transit's Long-Range Plan and should withhold any additional money for Link until a proper alternatives analysis has been completed, its results fully communicated to the public, and a public vote of confidence confirms voter support for continuation of Sound Transit's light rail strategy. Part 8 of this report outlines key requirements for conducting a proper alternatives analysis.**
- 2) The Sound Transit Board of Directors should voluntarily undertake the above actions with or without the FTA requiring same. They should do this to confirm they are on the right path and to restore public trust.**
- 3) Congress should investigate the manner in which mass transit grants are approved to ensure that FTA controlled planning processes are not abused in the ways chronicled throughout this report. They should investigate Sound Transit as one case example. Congress should insure that the process is redesigned to obtain the most "bang for the taxpayer buck". That is: greatest improvement in transportation at least cost to Federal and local taxpayers.**

The Sound Transit Board has no good reason to balk at taking these actions. If Board members are confident they are on the right path, a proper alternatives analysis can do nothing but confirm it, silence the critics, and help restore public trust. There is no reason why Link can't be put on hold since its completion wouldn't have much beneficial effect.

Vetting-- Authorities should immediately cause this report to be reviewed by an

objective team of experts to confirm or refute the logic, calculations and conclusions herein. This could be done in about six weeks. If those are upheld by the team of experts then there would exist reasonably credible, but still not conclusive, evidence that an all-bus strategy could achieve much the same benefits as light rail, and do so at a far lower cost. Such vetting would justify temporally halting construction on Link until a full-fledged alternatives analysis is complete in 12 to 18 months. Finally, Link could be restarted if the full-fledged analysis is favorable, or terminated if it is not.

Does it matter if the region spends billions more on mass transit than it needs to?-- This report concludes that pursuit of Sound Transit's light rail strategy could end up costing the region roughly a billion dollars a year more than switching to an all-bus alternative.

So what? Does anyone care?

The answers are not obvious. It will be interesting to see if anyone gets concerned enough to act. Perhaps the best way to make the cost of Sound Transit's rail plans meaningful is to list some of the other good projects that are being shortchanged because they are, in the ultimate analysis, competing with light rail for limited tax dollars.

***School-renovation fund \$11 million short** A Seattle School District review shows that its school-renovation programs are running deficits that could mean some projects will be delayed, trimmed or eliminated. (Sanjay Bhatt, Seattle Times, Aug. 4, 2004)*

***\$878 million more sought by Bergeson for schools** Terry Bergeson, state superintendent of public instruction, yesterday asked for an additional \$878 million for public schools over the next two years, an amount she says is essential to reach the goals of the state's decade old education reform law. (Linda Shaw, Seattle Times, Sept. 23, 2004)*

***Legislators Brace for Extra-Hungry Interest Groups** ...There will be pressure to expand colleges and universities and pay for multibillion-dollar transportation projects such as replacing the Alaskan Way viaduct.*

Much of this year's problem is pent up demand. Colleges, for instance, have not kept pace with population growth and many state workers have gone years without a pay increase. But it comes at a time when the state projects a budget deficit of around \$1.8 billion, after already struggling through several years of huge shortfalls. (Seattle Times, Jan. 10, 2005)

Sound Transit's 2004 Financial Plan says that \$2.437 billion will be spent on Link's Initial Segment between 1997 and 2009. In 2004 alone Sound Transit will collect \$271 million in taxes.

The amount of money going to even the Initial Segment of Link light rail would make a big dent in the funding needed to reconstruct the Alaska Way viaduct and rebuild the 520 bridge. But the Initial Segment is just the first step in Sound Transit's ambitions for light rail. Clearly the \$900 million per year difference between a 125-mile version of Link versus an all-bus alternative would be more than enough to pay for both projects.

In short, the money that might be wasted on Sound Transits rail-centric strategy is not an abstraction; it comes at the expense of opportunities foregone, and of other good ways to spend tax dollars.

Nor is the impact on the Federal budget, of questionable projects all across the

country like Link, something to ignore.

Congress lifts debt ceiling New borrowing to avert default

Congress last night sent President Bush an \$800 billion boost in the federal borrowing limit, spotlighting how the budget has lurched out of control in recent years and how difficult it will be to afford future initiatives. ... "I want someone to explain to me how it can be moral for a father to stick his kids with his bills," said Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss. (Seattle Times, Nov. 19, 2004)

Part 8: Guidelines for a proper alternatives analysis

Sound Transit is beginning to plan for Phase 2 of Link light rail. The DSEIS Long-Range Plan shows this will include a limited version of an alternatives analysis, but the only alternatives being looked at are the alternative ways to expand HCT above and beyond the 24-mile Central Link line which Sound Transit is taken as a given.

Limiting Phase 2 to just consideration of ways to expand Central Link does not provide voters and officials a full view of the alternatives before this region. Since Link construction has hardly begun, one option is to halt its construction and shift to a more cost effective alternative like BRT. Another is to build Link IS but truncate it south of the bus tunnel so it wouldn't interfere with a regional BRT system. Still another option concerns the full 100+ mile version of Link called for in Sound Transit's draft Long-Range Plan, and in PSRC's Metropolitan Transportation Plan. This 100+ mile version of Link needs to be compared apples-to-apples with a BRT alternative that is either equal in cost, or equal in benefit.

Part 8 describes these and other options in more detail along with technical guidelines to ensure the rail/bus comparisons are done objectively.

Early indicators for Phase 2-- Part 8 concludes with a litmus test that will give voters an early indication of whether or not Sound Transit plans to conduct an adequate and objective alternatives analysis as part of their Phase 2 planning.

Part 9: Main conclusions of this report:

- 1) The existing planning process is not producing the kind of information needed by officials and the public to make intelligent decisions about major mass transit projects. Important information is missing or obscured. Promising alternatives are ignored. Reports seem intended more to sell than to inform.
- 2) Sound Transit and its predecessor agency the RTA have abused the planning process in order to promote light rail. They biased key studies by making inappropriate assumptions and masking key information. They compared a robust rail alternative against a deliberately hobbled bus alternative. They disseminated misleading information to the public.
- 3) ST justifies its choice of light rail on the one and only rail vs. bus alternatives analysis conducted here since the 1980s. However, that study was deliberately biased to favor rail. When that bias is removed the underlying data shows that an all-bus solution could probably achieve the same level of benefit at far lower cost.
- 4) ST and RTP dismissed bus alternatives largely on false claims that buses lacked adequate capacity. Their analysis was deliberately manipulated to

support these claims. BRT has more than adequate capacity to meet the region's long-term needs. Light rail has less capacity than BRT and is therefore less strategic.

- 5) As construction begins on Link there is still no study which compares the benefits of spending \$X billions on light rail plan versus spending the same amount on bus rapid transit.
- 6) If the money now intended for light rail were instead redirected toward other projects such as BRT, car and vanpool enhancement, and other transportation projects the region could probably make considerably more progress in solving our transportation problems, because these other alternatives are more cost-effective.
- 7) By objective measures Link does not seem like something worth pursuing. Among other faults it would have almost no effect on traffic congestion and is not cost-effective as an alternative to driving.
- 8) BRT is a viable alternative to light rail in the Puget Sound Region. It could achieve the same benefits at a much lower cost and has more than adequate capacity to handle long term growth.
- 9) Link is the failed result of a faulty planning process. The process can and has been manipulated to favor preordained outcomes. It is not objective. It does not produce the type of information needed to make intelligent decisions. It fosters distrust. It is a process that needs to be fixed. This would take local and Federal action.
- 10) The region is embarking on a rail-centric mass transit strategy, which could result in over 125 miles of light rail. If fully implemented, that strategy will probably cost the region about a billion dollars per year more than an all-bus (BRT) strategy having the same level of transit ridership and related benefits. Meanwhile Link IS and Central Link are probably costing over twice what comparable all-bus alternatives would cost.
- 11) Link light rail is an example of the “waste, and abuse” that is driving up the Federal budget deficit, because it was sold on the basis of misleading information and because there are more cost-effective alternatives.
- 12) There has been insufficient public discussion about the merits or consequences of committing the region to this multi-billion dollar rail-centric strategy, and there is no solid analysis demonstrating it's the best strategy.
- 13) Transportation planning in the Puget Sound region has not placed a high priority on spending taxpayer money efficiently or in finding the lowest cost solutions.
- 14) Link should be put on hold and further Federal funding withheld until and unless a new and honest alternatives analysis is completed, and that analysis demonstrates that light rail is superior to BRT and other options. On the basis of available evidence, such a conclusion seems unlikely.
- 15) The FTA should review, and if appropriate withdraw, its prior acceptance of the 1993 FEIS as meeting FTA requirements for a proper alternatives analysis, since that particular analysis is faulty in so many respects and contains no apples-to-apples comparison between Sound Transit's light rail

plans and all-bus alternatives. By the same token FTA should not allow Sound Transit to proceed with any Phase 2 planning until a new and proper alternatives analysis has been completed.

- 16) Sound Transit's planning process for Phase 2 will not provide the information needed for this region to make intelligent decisions about massive investments in mass transit unless the recommendations listed in Part 8 of this report are adopted.
- 17) The PSRC should be forced to obey the State Law requiring Least Cost Planning because imposition of that planning technique is the single most important thing that can be done to help ensure that scarce transportation tax dollars are spent wisely.
- 18) Sound Transit's latest Long-Range Plan should not be approved because its very foundation, the 1993 FEIS, is obsolete and corrupt.

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